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JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this Court is found in Utah Code
Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(j)(1988 cum. supp.) whereby the
Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over orders, judgments,
and decrees of any court of record over which the Utah Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.

In this

case final judgment was rendered by the Honorable Dennis
Frederick, Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah on the 12th day of April, 1988.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The lower court heard argument and evidence on the State's
petition.

In a memorandum decision dated April 12, 1988, the

Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, District Court Judge, ruled that
the 1987 Dodge Caravan should be forfeited.
Decision is attached as Addendum A).
transcripts of the record below.

(The Memorandum

There are two volumes of

Volume I is referred to with an

"R" and volume II is referred to with an R.II.

The transcripts

also make reference to the testimony of Officer Steven Olson
given at the preliminary hearings of Mike Davis and Joan Davis.
These are attached as Addendum F (Mike Davis) and Addendum G
(Joan Davis).

vi

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Is the statute on takings, Utah Code Annotated Section

58-37-13 (1953 as amended) as applied to this case
unconstitutional under both the State and Federal Constitutions
because the results are grossly disproportionate to the crime?
2.

Is the taking and subsequent sale of the 1987 Dodge

Caravan supported by the facts of this case and the plain intent
of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13?
3.

Is there a security interest that prohibits forfeiture

in this case?
4.

May Officer William McCarthy's testimony be given in

civil proceedings if the State relies on statements made during
criminal custody but before a Miranda warning was issued?
5.

Does the warrantless seizure of the 1987 Dodge Caravan

invalidate the proceedings below?

vii

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution:
[Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution:
[Excessive bail and fines—Cruel punishments,]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive
fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted. Person arrested or
imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.
Article If Section 14 of the Utah Constitution:
[Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.
Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 (1987)
Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13 reads in pertinent
part:
(l)(e)
all conveyances including aircraft,
vehicles, or vessels used or intended for use, to
transport, or in any manner facilitate the
transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or
concealment of property described in Subsections (l)(a)
or (l)(b), except that:
(i) a conveyance used by any person as
a common carrier in the transaction of
business as a common carrier may not be
forfeited under this section unless it
viii

appears that the owner or other person in
charge of the conveyance was a consenting
party or privy to violation of this act;
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited
under this section by reason of any act or
omission committed or omitted without the
owner's knowledge or consent; and
(iii)
any forfeiture of a
conveyance subject to a bona fide
security interest is subject to the
interest of a secured party who
could not have known in the
exercise of reasonable diligence
that a violation would or did take
place in the use of the conveyance;
•

• • •

(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this act
may be seized by any peace officer of this state upon
process issued by any court having jurisdiction over
the property. However, seizure without process may be
made when:
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or
search under a search warrant or an inspection under an
administrative inspection warrant;
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a
criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this
act;
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to
believe that the property is directly or indirectly
dangerous to health or safety; or
(d) the peace officer has probable cause to
believe that the property has been used or intended to
be used in violation of this act. . . .
The complete text of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13 (1988 Cum.
Supp) is attached as Addendum B.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH
JOAN E. DAVIS, et al.,
Appellant,
vs.

No. 88-282

STATE OF UTAH,

Priority 14(b)

Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Dennis
Frederick presiding.

The State of Utah sought the forfeiture of

a 1987 Dodge Caravan on the basis that it had been used in the
transportation of one quarter (1/4) ounce of marijuana, pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended).
District Court allowed that forfeiture.

The

This appeal is to

determine whether the lower court abused its discretion in
allowing the forfeiture of the vehicle.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant desires that the lower court's decision be
reversed, that Appellants' property (or its approximate value) be
ordered returned, and that this case be remanded with
instructions either to dismiss the case or provide appellant with
a new hearing.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of January 19, 1988, Salt Lake City Police
Officers entered the residence of Joan E. Davis and Gerald Davis
at 140 West Gregson Ave., Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State

of Utah.

At that time said Police Officers arrested Joan E.

Davis and took possession of a 1987 Dodge Van, License # Utah
720BHT, VIN 2B4FK51G5HR179096.

The 1987 Dodge van was in the

driveway of the Davis' residence.

The van was purchased in May

of 1987 from Hinckley Dodge in Salt Lake City, Utah for
approximately $15,500 (R. 56-57).
The taking of the vehicle was carried out without a valid
search warrant (R.II. 54-55 and Preliminary Hearing Transcript of
Joan Davis, Officer Olson's testimony at 14). Moreover, the
seizure of the vehicle occurred on January 19, 1988, over five
months after the alleged marijuana transaction involving the van
took place on August 4, 1987. * The facts involving the purchase
of the marijuana transaction are in dispute and are developed in
detail in Point II, infra.

Not in dispute, however, is that

Appellant Joan Davis did not sell, purchase, exchange money, or
volunteer to get marijuana (R.II. 20-23).

At the most, Joan

Davis was only present to purchase marijuana for her own
consumption (R.II. 5-6).
In purchasing the vehicle, Appellant's husband, Gerald Davis
borrowed $10,500 from Rosalee Hansen (R. 7, 35-36, 57 ). On May
9, 1987, Gerald Davis signed a contract with Rosalee Hansen for
the loan of $10,500 and agreed to pay her $250 per month at 5%
interest until the loan was paid in full (R. 36-37, 57) (See

1

The information and affidavit of Officer Olson states
that the alleged transaction took place on August 8, 1987. (See
Addendum D). Testimony of Officer Olson supports that the
alleged transaction occurred on August 4, 1987, not August 8.
2

Addendum C). Gerald Davis further agreed to give the title of
the vehicle to Rosalee Hansen as security for the payment of the
loan (R. 58). Gerald Davis had made the monthly payments noted
since May 1987 to April 1988 (R.58).
Gerald Davis has an ownership interest in the van even
though his name does not appear on the title.

Furthermore,

Gerald Davis had no knowledge nor did he consent to any
controlled substance violation as contemplated by Utah Code Ann.
Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended) (R. 60).
Rosalee Hansen has a bona fide security interest in the
Dodge Van vehicle identified above.

This security interest came

about when Rosalee Hansen loaned $10,500 to Gerald Davis to
purchase said vehicle.

The loan was made on or about May 9, 1987

and Rosalee Hansen and Gerald Davis signed a Security Agreement
attesting this (R. 36, 57) (Addendum C). Gerald Davis deposited
$9,000 of the $10,500 in his bank account (R. 73) (the other
$1,500 was used to purchase a used truck).
On or about June 16, 1987 the title to the vehicle
identified above was signed over to Rosalee Hansen by Appellant
Joan Davis (R. 8-9). This was done as part of the Security
Agreement and the duly executed title was given to Rosalee Hansen
to hold pending full payment of the $10,500 loan.

Rosalee Hansen

claims an interest in the vehicle identified above to the extent
of her unpaid loan in the amount of $8,663.50 (R. 38). Rosalee
Hansen had no knowledge nor did she consent to any alleged
controlled substances violation or involvement as contemplated by
3

Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13 (R. 39).
Joan E. Davis had no knowledge nor did she consent to any
alleged controlled substance violation or involvement as
contemplated by Section 58-37-13 (R. 13-14, 20).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Forfeiture proceedings must be reviewed on a case by case
basis.

There are instances where the result of forfeiture may be

so great that the punishment is grossly disproportionate to crime
charged violating both the United States and Utah Constitutions.
Assuming, arguendo, that Joan Davis did participate in the
transportation and distribution of marijuana as contemplated by
Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended), the result of
forfeiture exceeds the constitutional bounds of permissible
fines.
Further, forfeiture is not supported by the facts of this
case.

The State of Utah's key witness, Officer Olson,

contradicted himself on the witness stand and in his written
reports.

Joan Davis' testimony is supported by the testimony of

two other individuals.

Joan Davis had no part or knowledge of

the drug transaction that occurred on August 4, 1987 which is the
subject of this appeal.
Even should this Court find Officer Olson's testimony more
credible and convincing than Ms. Davis', Mike Davis', and Kevin
Canham's, Officer Olson's testimony clearly indicates that Ms.
Davis' alleged participation did not rise to the level of
transportation to accomplish possession, but rather only to
4

transportation with possession.

Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13

is intended to strike at individuals involved in the trafficking
of drugs. At most, Ms. Davis' alleged activity is one of a
purchaser, agent, or one making an "accommodation call."

Utah's

forfeiture statute is not intended to strike at such individuals.
The result of forfeiture also violates the rights of Gerald
Davis and Rosalee Hansen.

Gerald Davis and Rosalee Hansen both

had a bona fide security interest in the 1987 Dodge Van.

Utah's

forfeiture statute protects such individuals and nowhere requires
that the security interest be perfected.
Further, a statement Joan Davis made while in custody
without a Miranda warning was used during the forfeiture
proceeding as proof that Joan Davis was the sole owner of the
1987 Dodge Van and was relied on in the district court's final
ruling.

This statement was incomplete as was the questioning

which prompted the response and should not have been allowed
since evidence which is obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment may not be relied on to sustain a forfeiture.
Finally, the seizure of the 1987 Dodge Van occurred on
January 19, 1988 over five months after the alleged August 4,
1987 transaction.
warrant.

Police officers seized the van without a

Utah's forfeiture statute requires a warrant to

accomplish seizure of a vehicle with limited exceptions that are
not applicable in this case. A warrantless seizure is in
violation of Ms. Davis' rights under both the Utah and United
States Constitutions.
5

ARGUMENT
I.

THE RESULT OF FORFEITURE IN THIS CASE UNDER UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED SECTION 58-37-13 (1953 AS AMENDED} IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS GROSSLY
DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CRIME CHARGED.
A*

THE PENALTY OF FORFEITURE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
DISPROPORTIONATE IN THIS CASE.

The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."

Similarly, Article I, Section 9 of the Utah

Constitution provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required;
excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted.

Persons arrested or imprisoned shall

not be treated with unnecessary rigor."
Forfeiture under Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 (1988
Cum. Supp) is clearly "punishment" as that term is used in the
eighth amendment.

Additionally, forfeiture, although punishment,

has been upheld in Utah as proper civil punishment regardless of
the amount involved in a drug transaction or the profit motive.
See State v. One 1983 Pontiac (Joe AraveK 717 P.2d 1338 (Utah
1986) (overruling in part State v. One (1) Porsche 2-Door, 526
P.2d 917 (Utah 1974)); State v. One 1982 Silver Honda Motorcycle,
735 P.2d 392 (Utah 1987).

The United States Supreme Court has

held that the eighth amendment "prohibits not only barbaric
punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the
crime committed."

See U.S. v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th

Cir. 1987) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)).
6

This Court has previously stated that "As for the small
amount of drugs involved, v[t]he courts have uniformly held that
a vehicle is subject to forfeiture no matter how small the
quantity of contraband found.'"

State v. One 1983 Pontiac (Joe

Arave), 111 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted).
Arguments have been proposed and upheld, however, that forfeiture
may exceed constitutional bounds and courts must look at the
results of forfeiture to determine if forfeiture is violative of
the eighth amendment.2

The time is ripe for the Utah Supreme

Court to make such a consideration and determine if in this case
the fine of forfeiture exceeds constitutional bounds.
In U.S. v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) the
defendant was convicted of federal racketeering provisions and
his business interests were ordered forfeited.

The 9th Circuit

determined that even though the forfeiture statute provided no
discretion, "the district court must avoid unconstitutional
results by fashioning forfeiture orders that stay within
constitutional bounds."

Busher 817 F.2d at 1415 (emphasis

added).
In determining whether a forfeiture order is so
disproportionate as to violate the eighth amendment, the 9th
Circuit stated a district court must, consistent with Solem,
"consider (1) the harshness of the penalty in light of the
gravity of the offense; (2) sentences imposed for other offenses
2

One such court is the Ninth Circuit. The Utah Supreme
Court cited One 1976 Porsche 911 S, 670 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1979)
in reaching its decision in One 1983 Pontiac, 717 P.2d 1338.
7

in the federal system; and (3) sentences imposed for the same or
similar offenses in other jurisdictions.

Ld. (citing Salem, 463

U.S. at 292). The 9th Circuit has added that a court is not
limited to the factors specifically mentioned in Busher, but may
take into account other relevant considerations.

U.S. v.

Littlefield, 821 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1987) (determining that in
forfeiture of property used to cultivate marijuana a court may
consider the value of the illegal drugs cultivated on the
property, and the nexus between the portion of the property
actually used to grow the marijuana plants and the rest of the
land).
This case is appropriate for this Court to determine if
similar discretion is to be given to forfeiture proceedings under
Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13. Assuming, arguendo, a $35.00 marijuana
purchase did take place in appellant's van, forfeiture of the van
went beyond constitutional bounds.

The State's chief witness,

Officer Steve Olson (the involved undercover narcotics agent)
testified that Appellant Joan Davis drove them to a home where
Appellant, Olson, Appellant's son Mike and his two friends Walt
King and Kevin Canham could acquire marijuana.

Olson testified

that Joan Davis' son, Mike, left the van and entered an apartment
where he purchased marijuana (Olson has given different accounts
of the transaction itself, see Point II and defense counsel's
closing argument at R. 79-81), and that upon Mike Davis' return
to the van, Appellant divided 1/4 an ounce of marijuana into two
1/8 ounce portions while all parties were sitting in the van
8

(Appellant denies these allegations) (R.II. 9). Upon calling
Appellant at her home on a later occasion and stating he wanted
to buy marijuana from her son, Appellant informed Officer Olson
that her son didn't sell marijuana (R. 14).
The harshness of the penalty in light of the gravity of the
offense in this case is severe and in violation of both the
eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 9 of the Utah Constitution.

Appellant (at time of

appeal) is still awaiting a criminal prosecution carrying a
potential penalty of five years in prison and a $5,000 fine.

In

addition to this penalty, Appellant has forfeited her van
recently purchased at the time of the arrest for approximately
$15,500.
B.

THE ACTIVITY OF MS. DAVIS AND THE 1987 DODGE VAN IS NOT
OF THE TYPE CONSIDERED BY THE UTAH FORFEITURE STATUTE;
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE FORFEITURE IS
EXCESSIVE AND VIOLATES THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS•

Appellant's activity, as alleged by Officer Olson, does not
rise to the level of transportation and distribution as required
by Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended).

Although

Officer Olson's police report alleges that he purchased marijuana
from the "defendant," when questioned about this at the
forfeiture proceedings, Officer Olson clarified that "defendant"
meant the parties involved.

Officer Olson testified that when he

asked Mike Davis what his mother was doing with him, Mike Davis
told him that she was there to buy some marijuana for herself.
Officer Olson did not purchase marijuana from Joan Davis.
9

(R.II

20-23) • Officer Olson never asked Joan Davis if she would get
the marijuana (R.II. 20). Joan Davis never volunteered to get
the marijuana (R.II. 21). Joan Davis never paid Olson for the
marijuana and Officer Olson never gave Joan Davis money to get
marijuana (R.II. 21). Joan Davis' alleged involvement and the
alleged involvement of her van never went beyond that of personal
purchase.

Neither Joan Davis nor her van were involved in the

distribution and transportation of marijuana within the intent
and purposes of Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13.

(See also Point

II infra.)
As the activity did not rise to the level of distribution
and transportation for purposes of the statute, the sentence
imposed does not fit the purpose of the Utah Forfeiture Statute.
The alleged activity of Joan Davis does not meet the imposed
sentence under the Utah statute and fails to meet forfeiture
statutes in other federal or state jurisdictions because
distribution and transportation are threshold elements to
forfeiture.
consumer.

Joan Davis, if involved, was nothing more than a

Neither she nor the 1987 van were necessary to the key

transaction all of which took place outside the van.
These facts do not support that Appellant was aware of and
supporting her son in drug dealing activities.

The evidence is

sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt.

State

v. One 1982 Silver Honda Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392 (Utah 1987)
(upholding forfeiture because evidence was not sufficiently
10

inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt). Consequently, the penalty
of forfeiture is harsh and unduly disproportionate and should be
reversed since it is an excessive fine in violation of the Utah
and United States constitutions•
Appellant has been criminally charged with a single
violation of Utah Code Annotated 58-37-8(i)(a)(ii) (1953 as
amended), a third degree felony carrying a potential penalty of
five years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.

Under the

circumstances of this case, to permit a civil fine to exceed the
criminal penalty by 300 per cent is disproportionate and unduly
harsh and exceeds the bounds of the Utah and United States
Constitution.

"Forfeitures are not favored and should be

enforced only when within both the letter and the spirit of the
law."

United States v. One 1976 Buick Skylark, Etc., 453 F.Supp.

639, 643 (D.Colo. 1978).

This case does not fall within the

purpose of the forfeiture statute.
Assuming arguendo that Appellant did divide marijuana into
two bags, the State's evidence indicates that the one eighth an
ounce of marijuana that Joan Davis received was strictly for
personal consumption and was not for distribution for erstwhile
law merchant principles. Appellant was led to believe that
Officer Olson was her son's friend.

Upon being contacted by

Olson later, Appellant answered his request for marijuana by
stating that her son did not sell marijuana (R. 14). The facts
as presented by the State are inconsistent with the proposition
11

that Appellant and the 1987 Dodge van were involved in the
transportation and distribution of drugs beyond the personal
consumption of Appellant's son and his friends.

To hold that the

1987 Dodge Van is subject to forfeiture is to subject any vehicle
that contains marijuana, with no de minimis exception, to
forfeiture.
Further, the ruling in this case is unduly harsh to Gerald
Davis.

Gerald Davis relied on a personal loan from Rosalee

Hansen to purchase the van.
punish Gerald Davis.

To seize the van is to ultimately

(See Point III, infra.)

Gerald Davis has

an ownership interest in the van even though his name does not
appear on the title.

Furthermore, Gerald Davis had no knowledge

nor did he consent to any controlled substance violation as
contemplated by Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended)
(R. 60 ).

(See also Point III infra.)

Appellant requests that Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13
be applied in principles of equity together with constitutional
results.

Forfeiture in this case is grossly disproportionate in

consideration of the factual circumstances surrounding this case
and is a fine that exceeds constitutional bounds.
The activity in this case does not merit forfeiture under
Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13 since the facts do not rise to
the required level of activity and to uphold forfeiture is unduly
harsh to Joan and Gerald Davis and to Rosalee Hansen.
Consequently, Joan Davis asks that this Court reverse the ruling
of the lower court and remand this case for dismissal.
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II.

FORFEITURE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS OF THIS CASE AND
VIOLATES THE PLAIN INTENT OF THE UTAH FORFEITURE STATUTE,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 58-37-13,
In State v. One Porsche 2-Dr., I.P. No. 911211026,

T.PP10026F, Etc., 526 P.2d 917, 918-19 (Utah 1974) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. One 1983 Pontiac (Joe Arave), 717 P.2d
1338 (Utah 1986) to extent that profit motive is not a
consideration in a forfeiture proceeding) this Court declared:
It appears obvious that the primary and sole purpose of
the statute and the intent of the legislature were
directed exclusively toward the transportation of a
controlled substance for distribution according to
erstwhile law merchant principles, and not for personal
possession and consumption.
The statute is transportation to accomplish possession,
not simply transportation "with" possession,—where the
obvious purpose of the statute is an interdiction
against transportation for the accomplishment of
distribution through pushers, pimps or pirates,—not to
accomplish a forfeiture because one has a marijuana
cigarette in his pocket or mouth, headed for
Disneyland,—or Arches National Monument.
One 1983 Pontiac, 717 P.2d at 1340 affirmed this principle:
We affirm that the major thrust of the statute is to
strike at those involved in the trafficking of drugs,
rather than at the individual whose possession is
solely for his own consumption.
Assuming, arguendo, that Joan Davis and the 1987 Dodge Van
were involved in a drug transaction the facts of this case as
supported by the testimony of Officer Steven Olson and the
individuals that were in the van establish that any action that
involved Joan Davis did not go beyond personal possession and
consumption, nor did such actions go beyond transportation "with"
possession.

Joan Davis' activities were not for the trafficking

of drugs, but rather, as Officer Olson testified, Joan Davis was
13

there to purchase marijuana for her own consumption (R.II. 5-6).
The facts in this case do not support that Joan Davis was
transporting drugs with an intent to distribute according to
erstwhile law merchant principles.

See State v. One 1982 Silver

Honda Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah App. 1987) (upholding
forfeiture because there was transportation with an intent to
distribute "according to erstwhile law merchant principles.").
Consequently, the decision of the lower court approving
forfeiture should be reversed.
Joan Davis testified that she had stopped by Mr. Randy
Bachman's home to find out when her son Mike was coming home for
dinner.3

she was showing off her van to Mike, Walt King, and

Kevin Canham when they asked for a ride (R. 12).
Joan Davis testified that her son, Mike, and his friend,
Walt King, got out of the van at what Officer Olson stated was
approximately Second East and 2800 South in Salt Lake City (R.II.
8).

Joan Davis had no idea what they were doing (R. 13). Joan

stated that the two came back to the van and Joan took them back
to Mr. Bachman's house.

The van never stopped, Joan had no

knowledge of marijuana and knew of no marijuana being split or
smoked in the van (R. 13-14).
Upon being contacted by Officer Olson on a later date so
that he could purchase marijuana, Joan Davis told him "I hope

J

The individual named Randy is referred to in the various
transcripts as Randy Bachman, Randy Kanab, Randy McNabb, and
Randy Packman. For purposes of this appeal, Appellant refers to
him as Randy Bachman.
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not.

Mike doesn't sell that."

When he called again she even

told him that Mike was not at home even though he was (R. 14).
In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to
support a charge of distribution of a controlled substance, the
relevant concern is whether the defendant performed, consented
to, offered, or arranged the actual sale of a controlled or
counterfeited substance, or merely acted as an agent between the
buyer and the source.

"The latter action does not fall within

the prohibition of distribution of a controlled substance for
value."

See State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 320 (Utah App. 1987)

(citing State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 134 (Utah 1986) and State
v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103, 104 (Utah 1983)).

Assuming,

arguendo, that Ms. Davis did drive across town so that she, her
son, and her son's friends could purchase one-quarter ounce
($20.00) worth of marijuana, Ms. Davis' actions cannot be
extended beyond a mere "accommodation call."

See Wright, 744

P.2d at 320 (defining distribution of a controlled substance).
To hold Joan Davis in violation of 58-37-13 and subject to
forfeiture is to establish that any individual that purchases
marijuana in a home and drives with it in her car is subject to
having her car forfeited.

Joan Davis' alleged activity does not

rise beyond transportation "with" possession.
Kevin Canham was with Mike Davis and Officer Olson on August
4, 1987.

(R 30).

Mr. Canham testified that Ms. Davis drove her

van to an apartment and that he, Mike, Officer Olson and Walt
King were in van.

Upon arriving at the apartment, Kevin Canham
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testified that Mike Davis and Walt King got out.

(R. 30).

When Mike and Walt King returned to the van, Kevin Canham
testified that Joan returned them all to Randy's where the young
men all went in a shed behind the building to divide the
marijuana (R. 30). Mr. Canham testified that there was never any
discussion as to why they were going, there was no dividing of
marijuana, and there was no smoking of marijuana (R. 31). Kevin
Canham testified that he didn't know marijuana was going to be
purchased on this occasion and that after the marijuana was not
brought out to be split up until the group, absent Ms. Davis,
were in Randy Bachman's backyard.

There, the marijuana was

divided in Mr. Canham's presence (R. 32).
Officer Olson, upon whose testimony the state relied in
obtaining forfeiture of the 1987 Dodge Van, contradicted himself
on numerous occasions.

Joan Davis' attorney opposed and

summarized these contradictions on the record (R. 79-81).

They

are discussed in detail here:
On August 4, 1987, Officer Steven Olson was working as an
undercover officer on Metro Narcotics Strike Force.

(R.II. 2).

Officer Olson stated he met Joan Davis through contact with son,
Mike, at Randy Bachman's, 331 South Sioux St. Salt Lake City,
Utah (R.II. 4)

Olson later testified that on August 4, 1987 he,

Joan Davis, Mike Davis, and Walt King (Kevin Canham was not
included as being in the van) drove to several places to attempt
to purchase marijuana (R.II. 7). Ultimately, a marijuana
purchase was made at approximately 2nd East 2800 South, Salt Lake
16

County.

Officer Olson had given Mike $35.00 so that Mike could

purchase marijuana for Officer Olson.

Officer Olson testified

that Mike Davis exited the van, purchased the marijuana, returned
to the van, and at that time Appellant Joan Davis drove the group
out of parking lot to about 215 East 2850 South where Ms. Davis
dumped marijuana out onto a round tray and divided it (R.II. 9).
Officer Olson then testified that Ms. Davis had pushed Olson's
marijuana into a baggie and put her's into a white sheet of paper
(R.II. 10).
Olson stated that Mike Davis took the marijuana, loaded some
into a pipe and that the pipe was passed around the van to Joan,
Mike, Walt King and Olson.

(R.II. 10-11).

At another point

Olson admitted he had testified to not recalling who lit the pipe
(R.II. 19). The police report makes no mention of any marijuana
being smoked.

Officer Olson was also confused whether the

marijuana was scraped onto a rounded orange tray or onto a silver
tray (R.II. 20). After the marijuana was divided, Officer Olson
stated that Joan Davis returned the group to Randy Bachman's
house at 3331 S. Sioux St (R.II. 10).
Officer Olson also stated he was positive that Mike Davis
was the only one that went in to purchase the marijuana (R.II.
12).

The police report and information indicated that both Mike

Davis and Walt King went into the apartment (R.II. 13, 15) (See
Addendum D ) .
Further, Officer Olson's sworn affidavit (information) says
the event took place on the 8th of August.
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At the hearing,

Officer Olson agreed that the alleged transaction could only have
taken place on August 4th (R.II. 17).
Officer Olson also admitted that he never asked Joan Davis
if she would get the marijuana (R.II. 20), that Joan Davis never
volunteered to get the marijuana (R.II. 21), That Joan Davis
never paid Olson for marijuana, and that he never gave Joan Davis
money to get marijuana (R.II. 21).
Officer Olson had purchased marijuana from Mike Davis on two
other occasions.

The routine was to return to Randy Bachman's

where the marijuana was divided in the shed or in the house
(R.II. 22). On no occasion did Officer Olson ever purchase
marijuana from Joan Davis (R.II. 23).
However, Officer Olson's affidavit and probable cause
statement against Joan Davis (solely) says that he purchased
marijuana from the "defendant."

The court dismissed defense

counsel's objection as quibbling about terms (R.II. 26). This is
a relevant fact, however, because it is the only possible fact
that directly links Joan Davis to distribution and transportation
for purposes of Utah's forfeiture statute.

Assuming, arguendo,

that the remainder of the information is true, by Officer Olson's
testimony Joan Davis is nothing more than one in possession of
marijuana—a mother who tagged along to collect (there is no
evidence that she purchased) marijuana for her own personal
consumption (R.II 5-6). There is no fact to support that Joan
Davis purchased, sold, distributed, or transported marijuana for
purposes of the statute on forfeiture (R.II 20-23).
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Mike Davis testified that he knew Officer Olson as Mike
Abershell (R.II 33). Mike Davis was working at Randy Bachman's
when Olson came wanting to purchase one-quarter (1/4) ounce of
marijuana (R.II. 35). Mike Davis asked his mother, who had
pulled up to see when Mike would be home for dinner, for a ride.
Mike, Officer Olson, Walt King, and Kevin Canham got in the van
(R.II. 35, 43). Walt King went in the house with Mike to
purchase the marijuana.

(R.II. 36). Joan Davis then dropped the

group off at Randy Bachman's house (R.II. 36). Mike never told
his Mother why he wanted to go (R.II. 36). Further, Mike
testified that the vehicle never stopped and there was no
splitting or division of marijuana in the van (R.II. 36-37).

The

marijuana was divided after they got out of the van (R.II. 44).
Mike stated that his mother had no knowledge whatsoever of the
events that occurred while Mike and Walt King were in the
apartment at Second East and 2800 South in Salt Lake City (R.II.
38).

Further, Mike Davis never smoked marijuana in front of his

mother. (R.II. 47).
Regardless of Prosecuting Attorney Skordas' statement that it is
"Hard for me to believe that the mother didn't also know what was
going on"

(R.II. 88), the facts as given by Joan Davis, Mike

Davis, and Kevin Canham support that Joan Davis did not know what
was going on when she gave her son and his friends a ride on
August 4, 1987.
Even assuming the facts as reported by Officer Steven Olson,
Joan Davis was not involved in the transportation of drugs for
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present because she wanted to purchase marijuana.

Neither Joan

Davis nor the 1987 Dodge Caravan were present to assist in the
distribution, transportation, or sale of marijuana and the
judgment of the district court should be reversed.
III. THERE IS A SECURITY INTEREST IN THE FORFEITED VEHICLE THAT
PROHIBITS FORFEITURE IN THIS CASE.
Utah Code Annotated 58-37-13 (1953 as amended) governs
forfeiture procedure and dictates what rights exist in the
property subject to forfeiture and reads in part as follows:
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture, and
no property right exists in them: . . .
(e) All conveyances including aircraft,
vehicle, or vessels used or intended for use, to
transport, or in any manner facilitate the
transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or
concealment of property described in subsection (l)(a)
or (l)(b), except that:
(iii)
Any forfeiture of a conveyance
subject to a Bona Fide Security Interest is subject to
the interest of a secured party who could not have
known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a
violation would or did take place in the use of the
conveyance.
U.C.A. 58-37-13 (l)(e)(iii) (1987) (Emphasis added).
In discussing third parties' rights under Utah's forfeiture
statute, this Court has stated:
Possible interests of others in the vehicle have been
adequately protected by the legislature. . . . Any
person claiming an interest in the vehicle can file a
petition for release of his interest in the property.
If the claimant has a valid interest that is not
subject to forfeiture the Court shall order release of
the property or partial release and forfeiture, in
which case the property is sold and the proceeds
distributed among legitimate claimants first.
State v. One 1983 Pontiac, 717 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Utah 1986).
In the instant case the State would have the Court believe
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that there is more required than what is set forth in the above
mentioned statute.

More specifically, something more than a bona

fide security interest.

However, the statute is clear in that

the property subject to forfeiture is itself, all other elements
satisfied, subject to the rights of a Bona Fide Security
Interest.
A Security Interest need not include a perfected security
interest.

These are two different terms under the Uniform

Commercial Code.

The issue is whether the security interest

under Utah's forfeiture statute is required to be perfected (R.
82) .
The statute in question does not require a perfected
security interest.

(Generally, see White & Summers, Uniform

Commercial Code, Section 22-3 at 965-73 (Third Edition 1988)).
The Supreme Court of Utah has explained that Bona Fide means
being in or with good faith, without fraud or deceit.

Combined

Metals Reduction Co. et al. v. State Tax Commission et al., 17 6
P.2d 614 (Utah 1947) .
This definition is still in harmony with the modern
definition referenced in Blacks Law Dictionary (5th Edition
1979):
Bona Fide
In or with good faith; honestly, openly and sincerely;
without deceit or fraud; truly; actually; without
simulation or pretense, innocently; in the attitude of
trust and confidence; without notice of fraud etc.
real, actual, genuine, and not feigned.
Blacks Law Dictionary at 160 (5th ed. 1979).
The court in First National Bank of Arizona v. Carbajal, 645
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P.2d 778, 779 (Arizona 1982), defined what a security interest
is, posing the question, " We must answer the following question
on appeal: (1) To what extent does the noncompliance with
Arizona's Motor Vehicle Registration Code affect the rights of
the parties?"

As part of the answer to the above question, the

Supreme Court of Arizona stated "A Security Interest is no more
than the right of a creditor to attach and perfect an interest in
the property superior to the interest of any other."

Ixi. at 783.

Further, the court stated "For a party seeking to perfect a
Security Interest in a motor vehicle, these provisions are
mandatory and failure to comply with Motor Vehicle Code results
in the parties having no right to enforce under that code."
(Emphasis added).
Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 does not require a
perfected security interest as the State may have the Court
believe.

Nowhere does 58-37-13 reference compliance with the

Motor Vehicle Code.
To the contrary, 58-37-13 requires a Bona Fide Security
Interest only.

This provision of the Code allows anyone that

claims an interest in the vehicle to petition the Court for a
release of that interest.

It does not require that a person have

a perfected security interest pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Code.
This provision allows the Court the necessary latitude to
review the interests of all parties to determine for itself
whether or not each petitioning party has a legitimate, genuine,
bona fide interest in the property in question.
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If the

legislature wanted the provision to be so cut and dried as the
State has argued it would have been very simple to add a phrase
that perfected interests pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Act are
required.
The Arizona Supreme Court concluded in the Carbaial case
that the automobile seller's retention of the title document was
a Security Interest.
hand.

This is exactly on point in the case at

Rosalee Hansen retained the duly executed title to the van

as a security interest in the van.

Gerald Davis and Rosalee

Hansen both have bona fide security interests in the 1987 Dodge
Caravan as contemplated in 58-37-13.

Each should be allowed

relief as provided for in 58-37-13.
While it's true that the state did not have a specific lien
against the vehicle for a loan, it is also true that the evidence
is clear that money was borrowed for the purpose of purchasing
this vehicle.
Joan Davis' husband, Gerald, and Rosalee Hansen are the real
victims in a forfeiture of the 1987 Dodge Van.

Gerald Davis took

a loan from Ms. Davis' sister, Rosalee Hansen, in the amount of
$10,500 to purchase the van which cost approximately $15,500 (R.
7, 57). The title to the van was notarized at Brighton Bank on
3300 South in Salt Lake City (R. 8) and given to Rosalee Hansen
as security on the $10,500 loan (R. 9). The title to the van was
transferred to Rosalee Hansen on June 16th (R. 9).
A security contract existed between Gerald Davis and Rosalee
Hansen covering the purchase of the van (R. 35, 57). The total
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amount of the loan was $10,500 (R. 36). The security agreement
was written on May 9, 1987 (R. 36) and had terms of $250 month +
05% interest (R. 57) (See Addendum C).

In turn the title went

with Rosalee Hansen (R. 58). Gerald Davis had made nine payments
at the time Ms. Hansen testified (R. 37). Gerald Davis still
owes $8,663.50 under the agreement (R. 38). Rosalee Hansen
registered herself as a lienholder at the end of March 1988 (R.
38).

Ms. Hansen had no knowledge van was used to transport or

distribute controlled substances. (R. 39). Further, Ms. Hansen
thought the agreement was legal and binding.

(R. 44).

Mr. Gerald Davis observed Joan Davis sign the title at the
bank. (R. 58). At the date of the hearing, Gerald Davis had paid
$6,938 into the vehicle (R. 58). Mr. Davis wanted the plates in
his wife's name and the title in both names (R. 59). Mr. Gerald
Davis had no information that the vehicle was being used in
transporting or possessing or distributing controlled substances
(R. 60). Mr. Davis gave a check to Hinckley Dodge for
$11,868.83.

Two other checks for tax and license were written in

the amounts of $650 and $42 (R. 62). Mr. Davis deposited $9,000
of the $10,500 that he had obtained from Rosalee Hansen (R. 73)
(Exhibits 9 and 10). Mr. Davis used the other $1,500 to buy a ton
and a half truck (R. 73).
Alan Tibbits, Vice-President of Brighton bank testified that
he notarized the signature on the Certificate of Title (R. 81)
(See Addendum E—Certificate of Title).

Tibbits, at the time of

the proceedings below had been the vice-president and manager of
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Brighton Bank for 8 years (R.II. 27-28).

Tibbits has been a

notary for over 18 years (R.II. 29). Tibbits was aware that a
sister or relative financed the van for Gerald Davis because
Davis could finance the van at a better rate (R. 27-29).
There is a difference between a security interest and a
perfected security interest under Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13 (R.
83).

A bona fide security interest exists when you give someone

$10,500.

58-37-13(9)(c) requires that notice be given to all

parties known to have an interest on claim on the property.

This

requirement is not limited to listings at the Division of Motor
Vehicles (R. 89). The $10,500 was a bona fide interest.

Because

of the interests of Gerald Davis and Rosalee Hansen the lower
court's ruling should be reversed.
IV.

TESTIMONY GIVEN IN A CIVIL PROCEEDING MAY NOT RELY ON
STATEMENTS TAKEN DURING CRIMINAL CUSTODY BEFORE A MIRANDA
WARNING WAS ISSUED.
Certain constitutional rules apply to civil as well as

criminal forfeiture proceedings.

See e.g., United States v.

United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 722 (1971) (fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination cognizable at in
rem forfeiture proceeding); One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965) (exclusionary rule applied to civil
forfeiture proceeding).
Statements made while Joan Davis was in custody without a
Miranda warning were admitted in this civil forfeiture proceeding
over the objection of Davis' counsel (R.II. 49-50).

Joan Davis

told Officer McCarthy that the van was hers (R.II. 50).
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A:

Q:
A:

THE WITNESS [Officer McCarthy]: I didn't ask
her anything. Chuck Oliver asked her — made
a comment, something to the effect, "That's a
nice van."
And the lady in custody, Ms. Davis,
stated it was hers and it was paid for.
(By Mr. Skordas:) It was hers and it was
paid for?
Yes. Excuse me. "I own it. It's paid for,"
or, It's mine." Something —

(R.II. 51).
Officer William McCarthy who works with metro narcotics
testified to these inconclusive statements which were made while
Joan Davis was in custody without a Miranda warning.

Testimony

which is obtained in violation of the fourth amendment may not be
relied on to sustain a forfeiture in a civil proceeding.
Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. 693, 702. Judge Frederick relied on
Joan Davis' statement in making his final ruling.

Judge

Frederick stated, "Joan Davis told the seizing officers McCarthy
and Lewellyn that the vehicle was hers and that it was paid for."
See Ruling at 4.
Equitable considerations should also exclude Ms. Davis'
testimony.

Officer McCarthy never inquired whether there was a

loan on the vehicle.

For that matter he didn't ask any questions

about the ownership (R.II. 51). Officer McCarthy works with
Gerald Davis and knew that Davis had borrowed money from Davis'
sister or sister-in-law (R.II. 52)

However, McCarthy never

inquired whether there was a loan on the vehicle.

McCarthy

didn't ask any further questions about the ownership of the van
(R. 51). Officer McCarthy's memory of the statement is not even
conclusive that Joan Davis stated that the vehicle was paid for.
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For Joan Davis' statement to be admissible, the officer should
have at least asked a complete set of rational and reasonable
questions about the ownership of the van.

Instead, the

prosecution relies on one isolated statement to argue that Joan
Davis owned the van. Appellant argues that neither McCarthy nor
Joan Davis viewed the question or the answer as complete.
Joan Davis' statement to officer McCarthy should not have
been permitted.
conclusive.

The statement made to Officer McCarthy was not

By McCarthy's own statement, he didn't fully

question Ms. Davis regarding the ownership of the van or about
any liens.

Nevertheless, the state relies on Joan Davis'

statement that she owned the van for proof of ownership.

The

district court erred in admitting this testimony and Appellant
asks that this court reverse the lower court's ruling and remand
this case for the forfeiture proceedings to be waived, a
permissible holding under Plymouth/ 380 U.S. at 702.
V.

THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF THE 1987 DODGE CARAVAN
INVALIDATES THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13 reads in pertinent part:
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this act
may be seized by any peace officer of this state upon
process issued by any court having jurisdiction over
the property. However, seizure without process may be
made when:
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or
search under a search warrant or an inspection under an
administrative inspection warrant;
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a
criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this
act;
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to
believe that the property is directly or indirectly
dangerous to health or safety; or
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(d) the peace officer has probable cause to
believe that the property has been used or intended to
be used in violation of this act. . . .
Evidence established at the forfeiture proceeding
established that no warrant was issued for forfeiture of the 1987
Dodge Van (R.II. 54 and Preliminary Hearing Transcript of Joan
Davis, Officer Olson's testimony at 14). Seizure of a vehicle
can only be "upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction
over the property."

Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13 (1988 cum. supp.)

(empha s i s added).
Officer William McCarthy was not aware of any warrant to
seize the vehicle.

(R.II. 54). The grounds for taking the

vehicle was that it's common procedure.

(R.II. 55). This State

action violated Joan Davis' fourth amendment rights and is in
further violation of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13.
United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 370 (3d Cir. 1981)
recognized that the forfeiture exception to warrant requirement
for seizures governed by the fourth amendment.

In United States

v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324, 330 (1st Cir. 1980), the First Circuit
read the probable cause exception to requiring a warrant for a
seizure:
as justifying the warrantless seizure of an automobile
only when the seizure immediately follows the
occurrence that gives the federal agents probable cause
to believe that the automobile is subject to forfeiture
under section 881(a) and the exigencies of the
surrounding circumstances make the requirement of
obtaining process unreasonable or unnecessary.
Id. (involved the issue of suppression of evidence after a
warrantless seizure 11 months after the facts giving rise to
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probable cause).
In United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1472 (9th Cir.
1983), the Ninth Circuit reiterated the principle that a
"warrantless seizure of a parked car is lawful under the
automobile exception only where specific exigent circumstances
justify an immediate seizure."

Spetz allows for warrantless

seizure of automobiles when two factors are present, "probable
cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband, and
. . . exigent circumstances associated with the automobile."

Id.

n. 28 (citation omitted).
Neither of the two key factors is present here.

The

officers that seized the vehicle had probable cause to believe
that the Dodge Van had been used in the past to transport a
quarter ounce of marijuana, but when the vehicle was seized while
parked in the Davis' driveway over five months after it was
allegedly used in the "transportation" for purposes of
distribution, the officers had no reason to believe that the
vehicle contained contraband.

Additionally, there were no

exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless seizure of the
vehicle.

The facts leading to the seizure of the 1987 Dodge Van

occurred on August 4, 1987. The seizure of the van took place
over five months later on January 19, 1988.
Although it is unclear whether dismissal of a forfeiture
action is the specific remedy when property subject to forfeiture
has been illegally seized, Application of Kinqsley, 802 F.2d 571,
578 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing Immigration and Naturalization
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Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984)) (Plymouth Sedan,
380 U.S. at 702 states that a court may exercise discretion in
waiving a forfeiture), should this Court determine that dismissal
is improper, the property (or its approximate value since the van
has already been sold) should be returned to its proper owners
until proceedings may be held consistent with the arguments in
this brief.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, Joan
Davis, respectfully requests that this Court reverse the opinion
of the lower court allowing for forfeiture of the 1987 Dodge Van
and remand the case to the district court for either dismissal
with return of the van (or its proximate value) or a new hearing.
Respectfully submitted this ,21 day of March, 1989.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

t
2

THE COURT:

Counsel, let me first express my appreci-

3 ation for your willingness to come over here and listen to
4

this ruling.

I had anticipated giving a little more notice

5 than what I've given you*

However, I am presently in Tooele

6 County and have to go back shortly, so I thought I would rule
7 while I am ready.
8

Let me say this is the time set at the Court's request

9 for ruling in the matter of Joan E. Davis et al versus the
10 State of Utah, case number C-88-655.

Counsel who tried the

11 case are present before the Court.
12

At the conclusion of the trial in this matter on the

13 8th of April, this Court took under advisement its ruling to
14 examine the authorities presented by counsel, to further
15 examine the exhibits that have been received, and is now
16 prepared to rule.
17

Title 58-37-13 sub.1(e) provides, inter alia, for the

18 forfeiture of conveyances used to transport or facilitate
19 the sale of controlled substances, except vehicles used for
20 illegal purposes not known to be so used or consented to be
21 so used by the owner, or vehicles subject to, guote, bona

72 fide occttrxty interest, end quote*
23

The state in this case argues that the term bona fide

24 security interest is synonymous with perfected

security

25 interest and therefore, unless the provisions of the Motor
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24 |proper "'and'•'unless one or, both of the pertinent exceptions
:25 -above- i ef erred to pertain, namely, subdivision 1,1- II11 I i :

1 iii under 58-37f the petition will be denied.

Specifically,

2 the issue is whether claimants Gerald Davis or his wife Joan
3 Davis was the owner of the vehicle in question and whether
4

or not the claimant Rosalee Hanson possessed a bona fide

5 security interest precluding forfeiture, at least to the
6 extent of hers, Rosalee Hansen's, claimed interests.
7

The testimony of the petitioners in this case, in this

8 Court's judgment, was not credible in certain critical
9 particulars.

Joan Davis completed the application for the

10 certificate of title and the issued title was in her name
11 alone listing no lienholders.

Gerald Davis stated in his

12 testimony that he knew that the vehicle was titled only in
13 his wife's name when the title was received on or about
14 June thr* 16th of 1987.

However, he testified in his affidavit^

15 before this Court, Exhibit 8, that he didn't know until the
16 vehicle was seized January the 19th of 1988 that it was
17 titled in the wife's name alone.
18

Joan Davis told the seizing officers McCarthy and

19 Lewellyn that the vehicle was hers and that-it was paid for.
20 Yet she testified in court at trial that the vehicle belonged
21 to her husband and that there were sums owed t>ir*the vehicle.

22

fcerald Davis D W the 20tW of SnnwBKY&c£ ISB8, the £ay

23 after the seizure ajud some eight jnoofctis SBtiSSBEfche, alleged
24 date*of the so-called Security agreement, EkhlDIt 4, told
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loan were in each,, evidenced by no cancelled checks.
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101 produced by Mi

25

iGerald Davi&'s .savings account where Rosalee •ay.money was

Gerald Davis

I IllIU b a n k 6 t 11

I ihibit

shows s SSJIDOO transfex fr om

1 supposedly deposited to the checking account toa May1 the ilth

of 1987.
3

A casual observation of the foregoing <litany of events

4 would reflect, I'm sure, -to the most bbjective observer that
S there aire too many loose ends and unexplained circumstances,
€ Mr. Larsen, to-determine that the petitioner's story is
7 persuasive.
8

It is therefore this Court's judgment that the

9 transaction between the Davises and Hanson appears to be less
10 than bona fide.

This Court is not persuaded that either of

11 the two exceptions in Title 58-37-13 pertain.
12 it is this Court's view that the

Accordingly,

petition seeking to stay

13 the forfeiture should be and is denied.
14

Mr. Skordas or Ms. Barbiero, I will ask that you please

15 prepare Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and
16 Judgment in accordance with what is stated here.
17

However, let me further indicate that I have touched

18 upon what I view to be highlights in the testimony and the
19 statement of the discrepancies in the testimiony is by no
20 ^eans intended to be all-inclusive.
21

Submit the Findinqs, Conclusions and Judoment to Mr.

22 Larsen for his approval as to form before submitting

23tthemto the Court*
24

courvsel, are tttfcre any questions in thi* matter?

25

MR. LARSEN: "Hour Honor, may we ask for a stay upon the
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neither of which issued

in my^udgment-, did Tibbits'

2 testimony bear upon*
3

MR. LARSEN:

4

THE COURT:

s

^banx you.
All right, counsels

I might say that

this has been a difficult case for me to rule on.

I mean,

6 it is very close and that is partly a product, I'm sure, of
7 the fact that counsel on both sides of the issue presented it
8 very clearly and forcibly, so you're to be commended on your
9 presentation, but someone has to rule and that falls on me.
10

MR. SKORDAS:

Your Honor, with respect to the judgment

11 in this matter, I suppose the state could take the judgment
12 one step further then to deny the petitioner's motion or
13 petition to set aside the forfeiture and to grant the state
14 its forfeiture here.
15

THE COURT:

Well, yes.

The effect of my ruling, of

16 course is to deny the petition to stay the forfeiture or to
1? avoid the forfeiture, which obviously means that the state
18 is entitled
19 however

to proceed with the forfeiture subject,

to any stay that might be imposed pursuant to the

20 petitioner's taking an appeal on this ruling.
21

MR. SKORDAS:

What I'm worried abourt

I ouess. is

22 -the stare now having to fi&e a Deti'ilon fax m forfeiture and
23 having a trfal on the matter,
24

THE COURT:

25 ruling.

No.

Forfeiture *•« arantedw

That's the procedure I'm following.

That's the

1

MR. SKORDAS:

2

Thank you

4I

THE COURT:

4J

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)
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case,

Court will be in recess
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3 STATE OF UTAH
4
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5
6

I, ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby certify:

7

That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License No.

8 220, and one of the official court reporters of the State of
9 Utah; that on the 12th day of April,

1988, I attended the

10 within matter and reported in shorthand the proceedings had
11 thereat; that later I caused my said shorthand proceedings to
12 be transcribed into typewriting, and the foregoing pages,
13 numbered from 2 to 9, inclusive, constitute a full, true and
14 correct account of the same, to the best of my ability.
15

DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 19th day

16 April, 1988.
17
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

58-37-13

•n authorized r\ d\* administrative lnspecti^. w a n -; law
enii • o-Tii(»nt officer or ^ n p l u w e designated in Secnm. -Vv.O * ha.- the
light:

(i) To inspect and copy records required by this act.
(ii) To inspect within reasonable limits and a reasonable manner,
the controlled premises and all pertinent equipment, finished and
unfinished material, containers, and labeling found, and except as
provided in Subsection (3)(e), all other things including records, files,
papers, processes, controls, and facilities subject to regulation and
control by this act or by rules promulgated by the department.
(iii) To inventory and stock of any controlled substance and obtain
samples of any substance
(d) This section shall not be construed to prevent the inspection of
books and records without a warrant pursuant to an administrative subpoena issued by a court or the department nor shall it be construed to
prevent entries and administrative inspections including seizures of property without a warrant:
(i) With the consent 01 Kit .»\\ia;r, operator, or agent in charge of
the controlled premises;
(ii) In situations presenting imminent danger to health or safety;
(iii) In situations involving inspection of conveyances where there
is reasonable cause to believe that the mobility of the conveyance
makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant;
(iv) In any other exceptional or emergency a
time or opportunity to apply for a warrant is h.
(v) In all other situations where a warrant is n > constitutionally
required.
(e) No inspection authorized by this section shall extend to financial
data, sales data, other than shipment data, or pricing data unless the
owner, operator, or agent in charge of the controlled premises consents in
writing.
History: L. 19*
-•
92, § 101.
A m e n d m e n t Notes.
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•: of this act,
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering,
importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this act;
(c) all property used or intended for use as a container for property
described in Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb);
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not including capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or
intended for use to administer controlled substances in violation of this
act;

58-37-13
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(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or intended for use, to-tTanspoftToniTany manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described
in Subsections (l)(a) or (l)(b), except that:
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the
transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited
under this section unless it appears that the owner or other person in
charge of the conveyance was a consenting party or privy to violation
of this act;
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason
of any act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's
knowledge or consent; and
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a bona fide security
interest is subject to the interest of a secured party who could not
have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation
would or did take place in the use of the conveyance;
(f) all books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm,
tapes, and data used or intended for use in violation of this act;
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this act, all proceeds
traceable to any violation of this act, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this act; but:
(i) An interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the holder of the interest did not know of the act which made
the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the
act;
(ii) There is a rebuttable presumption that all money, coins, and
currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, drug
manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia, or to forfeitable
records of the importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled
substances are forfeitable under this section; the burden of proof is
upon claimants of the property to rebut this presumption;
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in the Imitation Controlled Substances Act; and
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real
property of any kind used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating,
warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled substances in violation of this chapter, except that:
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or
interest in real property is subject to the bona fide security interest of
a party who could not have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would take place on the property;
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the holder of the interest did not know of the act which made
the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the
act;
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or
manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing, or
storage facility or interest in real property may not be forfeited under
this section unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on the
194
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property within a two-month period total or exceed $1,000, or the
street value of any controlled substances found on the premises at
any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experienced in controlled substances law enforcement may testify to establish the street value of the controlled substances for purposes of this
subsection.
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this act may be seized by any peace
officer of this state upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction-over
the property. However, seizure without process may be made when:
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant
or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant;
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding
under this act;
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is
directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or
(d) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has
been used or intended to be used in violation of this act.
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2), proceedings under Subsection (4) shall be instituted promptly.
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is not repleviable but is in
custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the
orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction. When property is seized under this act the appropriate person or agency may:
(a) place the property under seal;
(b) remove the property to a place designated by it or the warrant
under which it was seized; or
(c) take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location for disposition in accordance with law.
(5) All substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, distributed, or offered for distribution in violation of this act are contraband and
shall be seized and summarily forfeited to the state. Similarly, all substances
listed in Schedule I which are seized or come into the possession of the state
are contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the state if the owners are
unknown.
(6) All species of plants from which controlled substances in Schedules I
and II are derived which have been planted or cultivated in violation of this
act, or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or are wild growths,
may be seized and summarily forfeited to the state.
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its authorized agent, of any
person in occupancy or in control of land or premises upon which species of
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate license or proof
that he is the holder of a license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture of
the plants.
(8) When any property is forfeited under this act by a finding of the court
that no person is entitled to recover the property, it shall be deposited in the
custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all property is as follows:
(a) The state may include in its complaint seeking forfeiture, a request
that the seizing agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding that the
seizing agency is able to use the forfeited property in the enforcement of
controlled substances laws, the district court having jurisdiction over the
195
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case shall award the property to the seizing agency. The seizing agency
shall pay to the prosecuting agency the legal costs incurred in filing and
pursuing the forfeiture action. Property forfeited under this section may
not be applied by the court to costs or fines assessed against any defendant in the case.
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no application, any state agency,
bureau, county, or municipality, which demonstrates a need for specific
property or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall be given the
property for use in enforcement of controlled substances laws upon the
payment of costs to the county attorney for legal costs for filing and
pursuing the forfeiture and upon application for the property to the director of the Division of Finance. The application shall clearly set forth the
need for the property and the use to which the property will be put.
(c) The director of the Division of Finance shall review all applications
for property submitted under Subsection (8Kb) and, if the seizing agency
makes no application, make a determination based on necessity and advisability as to final disposition and shall notify the designated applicant
or seizing agency, where no application is made, who may obtain the
property upon payment of all costs to the appropriate department. The
Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse the prosecuting agency or
agencies for costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to exceed the amount of the net proceeds received for the sale of the property.
Any proceeds remaining after payment shall be returned to the seizing
agency or agencies.
(d) If no disposition is made upon an application under Subsection
(8)(a) or (b), the director of the Division of Finance shall dispose of the
property by public bidding or where deemed appropriate, by destruction.
Proof of destruction shall be upon oath of two officers or employees of the
department having charge of the property, and verified by the director of
the department or his designated agent.
(9) When any property is subject to forfeiture, a determination for forfeiture
to the state shall be made as follows:
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation shall be prepared by the
county attorney where the property was seized or is to be seized and filed
in the district court. The complaint shall describe with reasonable particularity:
(i) the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; and
(iii) the allegations which constitute a basis for forfeiture.
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the district court shall forthwith issue a warrant for seizure of the property which is the subject
matter of the action and deliver it to the sheriff for service, unless the
property has previously been seized without a warrant, under Subsection
58-37-13(2).
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the
county clerk, and served together with a copy of the complaint, upon all
persons known to the county attorney to have a claim in the property by
one of the following methods:
(i) upon each claimant whose name and address is known, at the
last known address of the claimant, or upon each owner whose right,
title, or interest is of record in the Division of Motor Vehicles, by
196
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mailing a copy of the notice and complaint by certified mail to4he
address given upon the records of the division, which service is
deemed complete even though the mail is refined orftgnnnthf for,
warded; and
(ii) upon all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but
who are believed to have an interest in the property, by one publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the
seizure was made.
(d) Except under Subsection (8)(c), any claimant or interested party
shall file with the court a verified answer to the complaint within 20 days
after service has been obtained.
(e) When property is seized under this act, any interested person or
claimant of the property, prior to being served with a complaint under
this section, may file a petition in the district court for release of his
interest in the property. The petition shall specify the claimant's interest
in the property and his right to have it released. A copy shall be served
upon the county attorney in the county of the seizure, who shall answer
the petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a complaint of
forfeiture.
(f) After 20 days following service of a complaint or petition for release,
the court shall examine the record and if no answer is on file, the court
shall allow the complainant or petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or release of the property as the court determines. If the county attorney has not filed an
answer to a petition for release and the court determines from the evidence that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery of the property, it
shall enter an order directing the county attorney to answer the petition
within ten days. If no answer is filed within that period, the court shall
order the release of the property to the petitioner entitled to receive it.
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at the
end of 20 days, the court shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days.
At this hearing all interested parties may present evidence of their rights
of release of the property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The
court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the
case and order forfeiture or release of the property as it determines.
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent of any other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under this act or the laws of this state,
(i) When the court determines that claimants have no right in the
property in whole or in part, it shall declare the property to be forfeited
and direct it to be delivered to the custody of the Division of Finance. The
division shall dispose of the property under Subsection (8).
(j) When the court determines that property, in whole or in part, is not
subject to forfeiture, it shall order release of the property to the proper
claimant. If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture
and release in part, it shall order partial release and partial forfeiture.
When the property cannot be divided for partial forfeiture and release,
the court shall order it sold and the proceeds distributed:
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants;
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure, storage of the property, legal costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture,
and costs of sale; and
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(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for the General Fund. •»
(k) In a proceeding under this section where forfeiture is declared, in
whole or in part, the court shall assess all costs of the forfeiiauX4U£C&ttU
ing, including seizure and storage of the propertjL^against the individual
or individuals whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and may
assess costs against any other claimant or claimants to the property as
appropriate.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, ft 13; 1982, ch.
12, ft 2; 1982, ch. 32, 5 9; 1987, ch. 87, ft 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1987, rewrote this section to the extent that a detailed analysis is
impracticable.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Forfeiture of vehicle.
Grounds for denial.
—Not found.
Forfeiture of vehicle.
Forfeiture of defendant's motorcycle was not
unduly harsh considering the value of the motorcycle versus the amount of contraband
drugs, where the evidence demonstrated concealment and/or transportation with an intent
to distribute. State v. One 1982 Silver Honda
Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Grounds for denial.
—Not found.
The court's denial of a petition by the state
for forfeiture of a vehicle — based on a combination of four factors: (1) The case was not set
for hearing within 20 days of the filing of an
answer to the petition, as directed by Subsection (9)(g); (2) the lack of indication of profit
motive in the transactions and small amounts

of drugs involved; (3) the question of possible
equitable interests in the vehicle by other parties; and (4) the value of the vehicle forfeited
appeared to be disproportionate to the use that
was made of the vehicle — was error, for the
following reasons: The delay in no way prejudiced the rights of the parties involved; this
section does not require a showing of a profit
motive on the part of the person involved in the
transportation and distribution of drugs; a vehicle is subject to forfeiture no matter how
small the quantity of contraband found; this
section clearly provides a method for satisfaction of the claims upon forfeiture of a vehicle;
and the value of the property seized is immaterial. State v. One 1983 Pontiac, 717 P.2d 1338
(Utah 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — For
comment, "Whose Right to Counsel Is It?,w see
13 J. Contemp. L. 161 (1987).

58-37-17. Judicial review.
(1) Any person aggrieved by a department's final order may obtain judicial
review.
(2) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings is in the
district court of Salt Lake County.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, ft 17; 1987, ch.
161, * 203.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-

ment, effective January 1, 1988, so rewrote
this section as to make a detailed analysis impracticable.
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ADDENDUM D: Information, Warrant, and Police Report

DAVID E. YOCOM
County Attorney
GREGORY G. SKORDAS
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111
Phone: (8011 363-7900

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

1

Plaintiff,

)

Screened by:
Assigned to:
BAIL

G. Skordas
Drug Team

$1,500.00

)

v.

INFORMATION
JOAN DAVIS

DOB 02/29/49,

1
Criminal No.
)

Defendant(s1.
The undersigned S. Olson - Metro Narcotics under oath states
on information an: belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes
of:
COUNT 1
UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION, OFFERING, AGREEING, CONSENTING OR ARRANGING
TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED OR COUNTERFEIT SUBSTANCE, a Third Degree
Felony, at 2850 South 215 Fast, in Salt Lake Countv. State
of Utah, on or about August -8,-JL33
4. in violation cf Title
£!_. Charter 3", Section 8f 1 1 { a V i i ) . Utah Code ir.notat*''
j y ? ) , as snen.iel", in that the defendant. JOAN DAVIS, a partv
:; the offense, did knowingly an-i intent ional V-* fistri>>jt*.
offer, fei-rcc-. consent or aTrance T O distribute a control". *H
or co'.Ji:t «-rf e? T substance, tc-vit: Mariiuana. a Controlled
S-JV<.*. P.-A*O :

THIS INFORMATION
KITNF.SSES:
5. Olson

!S BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING

c. ?% q u e u e

(Continued on page Two")

*'. Ho^son

la'vid S. Murdock

INFORMATION1
STATE v. -THAN DAVIS
County Attorney #88-1-74369/01
Page Two
PROBABLE CA.USE STATEMENT:

Count I:
On August 8, 1987 at approximately 2130 hours at 2850 South
215 East, in Salt Lake County, affiant purchased from the defendant
for $35.00 in cash a substance which has been analyzed and found to
be marijuana.
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me
this
day of January, 1988.

Judge
Authorized for presentment and
filing:
DAVID E. YOCOM, County Attorney

A

far

surf/261 2 c

Ind*"

, Deputy

88-1-7436901

Circuit Court, State of Utah
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
Eleanor VanSciver
Before

Judge of the Circuit Court
THE STATE OF UTAH
vs

JOAN DAVIS

D0B 0 2 / 2 9 / 4 9

Warrant of Arrest
Criminal No

Defendant(s)
(Address DOB)
THE STATE OF UTAH.
To am Peace Officer in the State of Utah. Greeting
An\ Information, upon oath. ha\inc been this dav made before me b\

S." O l s o n - Metro Ware # 8 7 - 6 3 1 8 5

ana it appears from the iniormauon or affidau:
Hied uith the information, that there is probable cause to beliexe that the public offerse oi

Dist.

C/S,

3°
has been commired and that

3o3n

Pav:s
-

ha* : -rr.itteo u

^01 ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to arrest the ano\t-n«ned oefencai^jon^unt- c

r-np the

a tncc^,, r>e or? -*vs Cw.n or be*w-e:ne nearer or mos: accessible magistrate for setting ban Ifthece s- z&— r***> Dec
justice. >ou snaH pursue the defenoant into an> other count\ of this state and tnere arrest tne oeieno*nt 1 ne C ourt fino>
reasonable grounos to bei»c\e defendant will not appear upon a summons

Ban » m in the amount of $
Dated thir

w

$1»S00.00.

da> of

January

. A D 19

88

This uarrant max be served da\ or mgm

Circuit Judge

FIELD NOTES
ETKO NARC./FELOHY
»*C CODE

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT-SR

JPRiMARY U f f t * » t -

JNOCCOOE

i

SECONDARY

OtHHSt

ttteO \J>LSrC/S-M(M£.
LASSIFICABON CHANGE
YES

ftp

NO f

j

Z4t*

OCCURRED:

FELONY?

vttfyr

CASE NUU6ER

ADDUSS Of OCCURRENCE

DATT-jfrfTW 2Jio

KOi j

POLICE DEPARTMENT
(DATE REPORTED

lg?63/g|r

*K,T7jt:<\A#>tc>£ ZKGtSo. ZIS~£

VEHICLE R E P O R T - V C
DDRESS Of RECOVERED STOUN VEHICU

[ADDRESS

WNER (LAST. FIRST)

(REASON FOR IMPOUND

JFIDAVTT FILED?

IMPOUNDED?

fSl

YES < > NO f

I NOC I

RESIDENCE PHONE

NO PHONE

CLAIM CHECK HiMBBk

HEIDPOR

I

DECKER COMPANY

WHtHt IMPOUNDED.

OTY O 2160 W. 600 SO.

VEHICLE CONDITION
O GOOD O POOR
C FAIR

D STATE
GNmON LOCKED?

KEYS IN IGNITION?

ES ( ) N O ( )

YES I ) NO I I

O OTHER
[WINDOWS LOCKED?

YES ( ) NO I )

DOORS LOCKED?

PROPERLY PARKED?

SCENE PROCESSED?

YES { | N O | >

YES ( 4 NO ( )

YES! ) * 0 < I

VEHICLE FIELD - 1 0
'SASON

£uS08*r

J C Y K fcJC. STATE

YEAR 1MAKE

4CdLOM«2

{COLOR » 1

\ Be+J

. _•

JBODY STYLE

MOOEL

yy}ftWL^-

VIN NUMBER

UNUSUAL FEATURES/DAMAGE

%t ucni

LICENSE NJMBEft

V/TJ

towr

CCTUblTtQrJ
TJFIELD
COMPLAINANT
FIELD -- $C

CCMPkAJNANT IS ALSO:

DO NOT f i l l IN BV. SP «r 9W. IF SOXES MARKED YES

-•• •»

:^r

VICTIM ( |

WITNESS ( ) PERSON LAST SECURING « }

KAME ILAST. FIRST)

ADDRESS

£ &tec^~ Q^

RESIDENCE PHONE JNO PHONE

BUSINESS PHONE

'

staph -MEr&o

SEX

lAGE.iOOe

RACE

HP'
/

^

WITNESS .K)RM?

YES ( I NO < I

YESt J NO I

NO PHONE

BUSINESS PHONE

I

pEX

_L_

f\AME (LAST. FIRST)

IR£.SJ0ENCTW0NE 1N0 PHONF" BUSINESS PHONE

•••-« , ? M

I

VICTIM FIELD - 9V

jap

ADDRESS

[SAME (LAST. FIRST)

RESIOENCE PHONE

/

CAN IDENTIFY?

AGE

RACE

DOB

7 /'
WITNESS FIELD -

ADORESS

SEX RACE

.

ui

AOE

CAN IDENTIFY*

J WITNESS FORM?

|

YES 1 1 NO t |

} YESI 1 N O I j

j

WITNESS *OAMT

j

9W

, : --

.

1

*

-...

DOB

** *
1 " V"

. 7* / ~

ICANlOEMTVr?

wiiT ~iT

»'• • ' •

—

M

x>w /SCHOOL txsnocT

PARENT*
<T* NOTIFIED*
NOT1F£I» lUATE A N D W E N D W E O .
YES

i

HER *AST. FIRST)

ADDRESS*

EK OR GUARDIAN (LAST. FIRST)

ADDRESS

*

^

^

• ^RELEASEDIO __ — v . - . ^ .

*

.— .-i

-

»•*'

•

• •

.

^

DP

^JREFEP-RED

1 0 T T T

• • • » • •

«•

'I *

I CHILD UVE WITH PARENTS?
YES ( \

• 5•

5a

NO PHONE 4

. . IT

_»*

«

NO PHONE

NAME Of PERSON IVfTH WHOM CKILT UVES (LAST, FIRST)

NO I I

ARTICLE

ID MARKS

-

£ NUMBER

TRADENAME
•

L NUMBER

•»

-

REASON

.•%

'

. ,

.

1

. % .".

•

•

•

•

Ygsf i iioi:>(

*

©NUMBER
*

"

.

-

•

-

•

•

•

"

.

#

CAN IDENTIFY? . *1

-^:

* -

REASON

COLOR

VALUE

.'.%

--w

T^l

!

DESCRIPTION

ID MARKS

i^TJ

*

TRADENAME

ARTICLE

. NUMBER

COLOR,.

I VALUE

DESCRIPTION

'•»•

nn

•

RESIDENCE PHONE

PROPERTY FIELD-11
TTTY

* . " « - - .

RESIDENCE PHONE

i•*••;.•

-

.-

.* ^ -

rr

••*

* .*r

|CANKiniFY?'~r
YES« 1 NOf

ANT *L$P0Ht>£01

YES ( I NOjfcpi
& T NAME

j> .

tf

•J»^

DETAttS OF INVESTIGATION > RC
^.

£> tveA/T 7D /rftze dtei/d je£tiz>&u&. /^fo 6yea6*ro*\
tf//te 7&ZJ7 J&k 7Q t**££r- ///0t

&^

/£*rtxfr
•»?>.">•::•<

m+&/2.

hrf

</£ 7f&&.

Ifewe^/^

v*
r. UJ&rtT- 7D &A/4 CM4£

^

J^^

OFFICER INFORMATION FIELD - 27/RR
JON

REPORTING OFFiCSR

U M l . OfflCER 10*/WV.

SSfWZin5J7B!v7 ASST. OFFICER
r.*\

; *
TATUS CHECK ONE

©«^V,

CLEARANOE. CMECJC* APPUCAftU

JABIOROUP- CHEOC IF APPLICABLE

ICOMPUTER ENTRY . I0»

ICASE NUMBER

METRO

H A R C O S

CONTINUATION' REPORT

#r

J/>J**0*:

SALT LAKE CITY L ^ (»a>t

2

'2>/ZCn/£ STA/ro /?W /fr?r. dOvtf/>£JFJT
2f66Sr> Z d g g . " > ^ ^ A^O UJOt^^BA^r -7rt

&J£ tr* -ru^ /fart.
Jgtf MM &11/AA) "/tf/A^ZSP-7D"/to*><>H4f€. /foz~.
/7ff££ tVAi? rz> f>#*f /%6 7 f
\ROAZ,

/M^TT^

/ / ^ /

JLbtfrj

77^

& U^

&&T7J.&SBf)
J>Jt£>t/£ US

WP/&&XL:

/^/=>*>C
-7Z> 4

£*/*#&.

Ou£L&

/**&£.;

CQ17&

<4~7~ IftZ
Y&W2&

ZfSDg*.

*>/££S~

?£fL
StfZ. ' S&ZA/J&O
\&jje&/>£tf

73*£

'&' /2£77ArA/&1

{:£& MAT*

<5AT£ 0P-

7ZS& />/£££

&YZ*&eL <&/f7D 4
77/£

&f&y

&t£

JW7D

0f&2£l

C^

<&=*>7- 72/£

^fa.

RA*r.

&&*&£.
/&&&£

-
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4501 SOUTHWO^ .VEST, *223 - SALT L A K » I T \
Phone (801)965-4487
t*me (Last Frsl. Middle)

D.OB.

AVIS, Joan

JTAH 84119

(Filed out by laboratory)
Laboratory No.

am* (Usl.FtfSt. Middle)

D.OB.

a m (Lest First, Middle)

D.OB.

87*2635

J Agency pass Number

67-631BS
Typtof Rtporl

Dist. c/s f/v
quesbng Analysis

Requesting Agency a Address

Olson

Agency Phone »

35-7252

Sali Lake Metro

na (Last, First. Middle f

j Date I Tan* ot Occurranc*

08/04/87
elusion of tha eneiysit tha evidence will be:
(ed up by agency

Q

D Other

MauL to agency

aquestad and Special inttmctiom

>prox. 1/8 o*. marijuana

a

r~| HandwrtUr^

Fmgerprints

2130 hrs.

Date ft Tme ot Roquoct

D Other

gr^^^^^^Bi
jsigr|£ is prepared t o testify that | ^ i s employed by the <$jtf^"^\%g**u
j^ ^
, 19
ob)Btr> from
of:
L J Evidence as per property Invoice
L J Other

%

13th

and that he did on the
_

id make 8n examination and analysis of this evidence and in his opinion:

e plastic b*g was found to contain 3.3 grams ot crashed marijuana.

elusion of theapety^g t h f evidence on the
O
Analyst
#4*

~

R t l

* m d to

Q

/^w v
Mailed to

day of

d^y ,
trident
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ADDENDUM F: Transcript of Mike Davis'
Preliminary Hearing—Testimony of Officer Steve Olson.

Steve Olson's Testimony

STATE vs. Mike Davis

Sworn In

State:

You are employed with the Metro Narcotics Strike Force?

Olson:

Yes,

State:

And aside

from that

are you a police officer for Salt

Lake City*
Olson:

Yes.

State:

How long have you been a police officer, sir?

Olson:

Eight years in April.

State:

How long have you been working <with Metro Narcotics?

Olson:

Eight months.

State:

Were you with Metro back in Aug. and July of

Last year

sir?
Olson:

Yes, sir

State:

What were your duties at that time.

Olson:

At the first part of June, I entered Metro narcotics to
go into a undercover narcotic.

State:

What were your duties?

Olson:

To work undercover and attempt to fight drugs at street
level and try to gain a little more information to go a
little bit higher than lust narcotics.

State:

Did you during the course

of

your

work

acquainted with one known as Mike Davis*
Olson!.

Yesf I did.
I

there become

State:

Would you recognize him if you saw him again?

Olson:

Yes

State:

Is he seated here in the Court?

Olson:

Yes, I see him at the Defense table.

Def:

We will stipulate this as Mr. Davis, your Honor

Judge:

The stipulation is received.

State:

Did

these

events

you

are going to describe occur in

Salt Lake County, Sir?
Olson:

Yes.

State:

When did you first meet Mike Davis?

Olson:

I'm not sure of the exact date, I met him in the summer
another acquantance

where I

was purchasing drugs from

at 3331 South on Sue Street.
State:

At some time did

you

have

some

discussion

with Mr.

Davis on purchasing drugs.
Olson:

Yes.

State:

Did you have contact with him on August 4th.

Olson:

I donft

have a

copy of

donft know if it

is a

numbers

pulled

I

have

what happened on August 4.
mixed case

or what.

I

The case

from the booking sheet that I

understand he was charged with.
State:

Do you have an independent recollection of what occured
on Aug. 4*?

Olson:

No, not really.

2

State:

May I have just a moment please, your honor.
Have you had chance to review that, sir*
This is the report we just finished.

Def:

Objection

to

that

Your

honor,

independent recollection of
The prosecutor

trying to

The one on Aug 4.

he

what

said

occured

he
on

had no
Aug. 4.

refresh his recollection and

hasn't been able to do that.
State:

Have you had a chance to review the report dated Aug 4?

Olson:

Yes, I have.

State:

Does it refresh your memory as to what happened on that
date?

Olson:

Yes.

State:

Can you testify without the use of the report?

Olson:

I believe I can?

State:

To the best of your recollection, what happened on that
day, please?

Olson:

to Mikefs residence

In the evening of that date I went
on

Gregson

marijuana.
Sue

Street

waited.

Ave.

and

inquired

about purchasing some

He told me to meet him at Randyfs
so

I

A Van,

went

back

to

Plymouth Van,

State:

Who was in the Van?

Olson:

Mike was

in the

Van also.

I

3331 Sue Street and

pulled up.

that it was Mike's mother driving.

house on

I learned

He was in the Van.

walked up

to Mike and

asked him If he was going to get me some Marijuana,
said

Yes, he

and

his
3

He

mother were both going to get

some.
I

At that point another person that was there that

was

also

acquainted

with,

a

seventeen

year old

juvenile named Walt decided that he wanted
to come along with us,

So at

into his

She was driving.

mothers Van.

that point,

we all got
She drove to

an apartment complex on 215 East about 2850 South, that
is an

estimate address and we went into a pOarking lot

to the apartment complex and waited.
the

$35

that

apartment.

I

had

He came

given

him

out maybe

and

went

10 minutes

told his mother to leave the area.
apartment complex onto I

Mike took some of
into the
later. He

We drove out of the

beleive it

was 200

East and

went to the next cross street South and turned and went
East bound about 1/2
the rode

.

Marijuana.

block.

At that

His mother

point Mike

I beleive 1/2 ounce.

pulled aside

handed her

a bag of

She proceeded to dump

it out onto a tray and proceed to divide it up.

I held

a baggy out, a small plastic bag and she put my portion
that

I

had

purchased

into

the baggy.

don't remember who did it, someone

in the

I believe, I
Van, either

Walt or Mike or his mother pulled a pipe out and loaded
it and

was passing

marijuana.

a pipe

around in

the Van smoking

I simulated taking one hit off the pipe and

told them I didnft want anymore.

We

then

went to the

Sue Street address.

I was dropped off there. Mike got

out of the Van.

took Mike

I

4

back to

Gregson and he

paid me

back $10. We agreed that I would give him $35

and he said he would pay me back $15. When we got back
to his house he gave me $10 of that $15
and

went

back

into

his

house

and

I

left with my

marijuana.
State:

Did you have contact with him on July 14, Sir?

Olson:

Yes, I did*

State:

Did this occur at or about 3331 South Sue Street?

Olson:

Yes it did, I am referring to my notes.

State:

Can you tell us what occurred on that date?

Olson:

Yes, I went to the Sue
He was

there with

Street address,

contacted him.

Randy, the' owner of

the house. I

asked if I could purchase 1/4 gram of cocaine.
him if

he knew

where I could get some.

I asked

He told me he

knew of a hooker who sold cocaine and he could get some
for me.

At that point, we got in my vehicle and drove

approximately 521 East on 800 South
white came

out to

in SLC.

A female

our car, spoke to him briefly.

She

got into my vehicle with us. We drove at her direction
to 800

7-11 there

to a pay phone.

She got out of my car and made a phone

call, 1 assume,

and we

South 200

East, a

waited for several minutes and a vehicle with a

female black and a male

black

pulled

up

in

a small

compact car. The male black got out and she was out of
my vehicle at that point.
he,

the

male

black,
5

They spoke to each other and

became

pretty

agitated and he

bounded on the hood of

my

accused both

me of being Narc. At that point

Mike and

car

the female white that was with

a

little

us she

bit

and he

got freightened

and came back to my car and told us to drive out of the
area that something was
instructed me
800 South.
street.

wrong.

I did so.

She instructed us to park up the

her out

in front of her house and we

were instructed to park up
did.

the

street

a

little ways

She had money that I had given Mike to

purchase the cocaine so we were
1/2 gram

out and she

to drive back to her home at 521 East on

We let

which we

I backed

of cocaine.

attempting to purchase

Approximately 5 minutes went by

and the same vehicle with the male black and the female
black that was at the 7-11 had come to the house at 521
East 8th South.
been with

us ran

residence.
think

Pulled up

they

the female

out to the car and ran back into the

Mike told me, I think something is wrong, I
are

trying

to

rip

us off, we pulled up

forward to the house, he jumped out and
door of

the house.

There

and stood by the car.

male black , not
but another

the one

male black

him up against the car*
going to

beat him

knocked on the

was some exchange of words

between him and someone in the house.
th^ car

white that had

He came

back to

I was sitting in it. A

driving the
came out

car previously,

of the house, backed

Made some threats that

he .was

up, or something. He handed a paper
6

bindle.

He took the bindle and jumped into my

told me

lets get

out of

here.

He showed me the bindle and

car and

At that point we did.

told be

to drive

back to

3331 South Sue Street.
State:

What happened there?

Olson:

Well, we

reached Sue

Street.

that was located behind

We went

the house.

into the shed

Randy

back there that he stored minor things in.
the bindle.
of cocaine.

Showed the cocaine to me.
Told

had a shed
Mike opened

Gave me a flake

me you should put in on your tongue

to taste it. At that point the flake was on my finger.
I took my finger, flipped it off and pretended to stick
it into my tongue

acting like

told me it was suppose to
did.

I was

tasting it.

He

numb my tongue and I said it

At that point, he told Randy who was also present

to make

anew bindle.

He cut a square piece of paper,

folded it up and Mike took the cocaine and
divided it into semi-equal
up, put

Mike

divided it

it in my bindle and at that point He and Randy

proceeded to shoot the
as

portions.

they

were

cocaine up

doing

that

with

sryinges and

I just took my cocaine and

left.
State:

I have no further questions.

Def.

I wish to cross.
thing
that

that
you

you
saw

Mr.
are

Mr.

Olson, in

regard to

this last

testifying about, are you saying
Davis
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shoot

the

cocaine

with a

syringe.
Olson:

What I

believe.

I saw him draw water up and heat up a

spoon.
Def.

Did you see him shoot anything into his arm?

Olson:

I saw him take the syringe and point it in

and he went

out of the shed by the shed and hung on the side of the
house.

I thought he was going to have a heart attack.

Def.

Hung on the side of the house?

Olson:

Yes,

Def.

And this was all in front of Randy McNabb?

Olson:

Yes.

Def.

Is Randy McNabb

charged

with

this

particular charge

also?
Olson:

I believe he is.

Def

Well, you

I'm not sure.

would have been the one who would have wrote

out a complaint against him to the prosecutor.

Do you

remember doing that?
State:

What difference does it make?

Judge

Objection sustained

Def

Your honor

in terms

I object

of the right to cross examine the

witness, it seems like I have a right

to know

present

I

during

these

transactions*

can

who was
ask

him

whether he went down and complained about him.
State:

she is now

Judge:

you can ask

Def

Do you recall

filing

any
8

complaint

with

the county

attorneys office about Randy McNabb?
Olson:

He has numorous charges, I don't know if this 18 one of
them.

Def

Is

it

possible

that

you

got

this

mixed

up

with

Mr.Davis's charges during your investigations?
Olson:

No.

Def

Was

anyone

else

present

during

the shooting of the

cocaine.
0.

No, just myself, Mike and Randy.

Def

And you are sure

that occured

on July

14, in Randy's

shed •
0.

Yes

Def

Now,

as

to

the

mother's Van.

charge

You

occuring

initially said

as

to Mr. Davis's

that you

could not

remember the charge.
0.

He gave me a specific date.
charges on

Mike and

There are approximately 10

only 5

were filed.

That's why I

didn't have specific recollection until I looked at the
report.
DEf

Why were the others not filed.

0.

I guess overkill.

I have no idea.

It's

at the county

attorney agent,
def

In

you

report,

in

your

regard

to that charge, you

reported that you left Mike off at some
It a Gdrdan lane location?
0.

A what?
9

location.

Was

def

Do you

still have

that report?

What was the original

amount of money that Mike had given you?
Judge:

Are you talking about a specific time?

def

On August 4th in connection with his mother's van.

0.

I gave him, he didn't give

me any

money,

I gave him

$35.
def

$35 and then he gave you $10 back.?

0.

Yes.

def

So the

actual purchase

price was not $35 as you swore

to in your complaint but actually $25.
def

I don't know.
price or

I didn't

not.

I guess

guess it was $20.
because

he

know whether

should

it doesn't

Actually
have

it

given

they wanted that
really matter.

would
me

have

I

been $20

$15 back.

So the

purchase price would have been $20 for the 1/4 gram.
def

In you complaint, well I guess you don't have a copy of
that either.

The

original cash

amount $35.

He gave

you $15 so the original sale price was $20.
0.

Well it was $25

since

back.

have been

It would

he didn't give me the

def

So that was actually your fault.?

0.

I took the number off the

def

You forgot about the change that was made?

<>•

Yes.

def

But in that report it indicated that Mike
of

the

$15

that

he
10

other $5

complaint.

owed

and

you

gave you $10

left,

no other

transactions and

you did drop Mike at the address of a

relative. Do you recall that?
I don't recall where or what relative it is.
Well 70U indicate 170 East Garden Lane.
Then that is where I dropped him.
Do you recall what relative that was?
No
Do you remember that address?
170 GQtrdon Lane.
recollection

No,

because

I

of

don't
the

have

amount

an independant
of times that I

drove Mike. The report was written that I went directly
to our undercover pad.
Did

you

keep

anyother

reports

concerning

relationship with Mike Davis independent of

your

these 4 or

5 days that you cahrged him of selling the firugs.
I have a ledger that I kept.
And do you have a ledger of when you met him.
It is in the ledger and I would have to look.
Did he ever call you on the phone?
I don't

recall.

It might be in those notes.

I don't

recall.
Do you have his ph^ne number.
I gave him a

phone number

of our

undercover pad.

.1

believe, I am not sure.
At any

time did

he ask

drugs.
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you if

he could get you some

If he could get me some?
You didn't ask him.

He didn't ask me.

You always asked

was always your initiative.
In the

course of

him* right?

It

He never brought it up

conversation. He would come over and

say
But you would bring it up.

Did he ever bring it up?

I don't recall.
But you don't recall that he ever did.
no
You made some testimony as to
it

was

the

2929

testified to.
Street.

You

South

one address.

200

East

later found

I believe

address

out to

that you

be 183 Gdrden

That is the same address

Yes
and who is at that address
No one now.

It is a vacant apartment.

Well who lived there at the time
It was a kid I identified as Jimmy Williams
And

that

is

the

person

who you think Mr. Davis was

buying the drugs from.
He is the one
drugs.

who was

with us

the night

I purchased

All three of us were in my vehicle.

The ounce

on marijuana the we divided.
How about Kevin?

Did

you

run

into

a

person named

Kevin?
Kevin was orignally when Mike got into my vehicle
12

I thought he said this guys name is Kevin and it turned
out to be Jimmy,
So there wasn't a Kevin
No.
Walt, was there ever a

Walt?

Yes.
And when was Walt present.
He was present when we went in Mike's mothers van
Who else

was present

other that

Wait, Mikefs mother,

Mike and you.
No other in the van.
And you
No, he
time.

quite sure Kevin wasn't present I mean Jimmy
wasn't.

We went

to a different location that

We went up the street from Jimmy's house.

was another

There

apartment complex we went into the back of

that apartment complex.
But they weren't in the Van.
No Jimmy was never with us.
Are you denying that a guy named Kevin was
the time

that Mike

and his

present at

mother participated in a

drug transaction with you.
I was never acquainted with a man named
acquainted with

Mike.

^evin that was

Kevin when they brought him out

the first time turned out to be Jimmy•
Well what do you mean by that. You thought his name was
Kevin.

Maybe his name was Kevin.
13

How did he turn out

to be Jimmy.
I have identified him since.

I have a warrent

out for

his arrest.
And your

warrent is for Jimmy Williams who may in fact

be Kevin.
I spoke to his mother.

She said his name was Jimmy.

Does he have a middle name.
Well I don't know.
Where did you speak to his mother?
At her home.
These other addresses that you have indicated.
Garden Street

2929 South.

The

We got

3000 South St. Street

address that you alledged that a buy took place.

Whose

address is that?
No that wasn't the 30th State.
canal.

That was the one by the

Is that the one your referring to?

I am

referring to

that

a

man

had

the one

that you

unlawfully,

agreed

swore under oath
or consented to

distribute drugs to you

at 3000

And

what address that is?

I

am

asking

you

located at that address?

Street.
What is

What events took place?

I donH have a map of the city.
what

South State

I donft have

any idea

is located at that address.

Well you swore that something happened there. In regard
to violation %o the drug laws*
I would have to know what date.
14

I have 5 cases.

def

You said it occured July 17.

0.

ok

def

I believe it was one

of

the

first

things

which you

testified*
0.

On July 17, it states in my notes on 2929 So. 2nd East.

def

So you have no knowledge of a 3000 South St.

0

I imagine that was an approximate

def

Maybe if

I could refresh your recollection.

copy of that account 4 on July 17 at that
the

defendant

Mike

Davis

marijuana and here is

your

offered

or

Here is a

address that
distributed

signature swearing

to it.

Correct?
0.

Yes, it is a typeagraphical error.

def

And

you

have

no

knowlege

again on July 17, approximately

1946

of that.

Well here it is

hrs.

3000

at

south st.

purchased from Mike Davis $40 of marijuana.
0.

It should be 2929 South 200 East.

def

Do

you

remember

what

Mr. Davis was wearing on these

occasions?
0.

No I don't.

def

Do you remember whether or not he had a mustache?

0.

He might have had a slight one in the summertime.

def

Do you remember when it was that you met him?

0.

Like I say.

def

Do you have it with you.

0.

No, I do not have it with me.

It may be in my notebook.
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def

Do you remember how many conversations you had with him
before you first sold him drugs,

0,

No, not off hand

def

Do you remember the subject of those conversations?

0.

They were

just small

talk at

Randy's house because I

remember I had already purchases marijuana
def

Do you

remember how

many minutes

of conversation you

had with Mr. Davis?
0.

No, I don't

def

Prior to

him first

selling you drugs.

Could you tell

me if it was an hours worth or 10 hours worth,
0.

Well it was less than 10 hours worth,

def

Closer to an hour.

0.

I can°t

guess.

I would just estimate an hour total at

the time.
def

Did you keep any record of those conversations?

0.

Minor notes like I say at the time

def

Do you have those notes

0.

I do not have them with me

def

They are available

0.

Yes.

def

Is there

anything else you va^t me to ask?

No further

questions, your honor.

It was then amended that 3000 so State should he
South 200 East
16

changed to 2929

Judge:

I will grant to motion to make the amendment

def.

One further

question, your honor.

Didn't you say 2929

South 200 East didn't turn out to be an address.
0.

Well that was an estimate,

def

So that turned out to not be correct

0.

183 East Garden Street,

def

Amended 2nd time

Judge

The address on account 4 would read 183 East

Street.

def.

on Gcfcrden

The proable cause statement

I would

just like to ask him one more question in view

of these amendments.
183

East

Garden

Mr. Olson, you were aware of this

Street

address

on the day that you

swore out this warrant were you not?
0.

I don't recall when that was

def

Well If I could refresh your
copy of
there is
confusion

the warrant

that you

the address
of

the

recollection.

swore to under oath and

listed, right?

address

of

Here is a

So

in terms of

2929 it didn't seem to

exist in your mind at the time.
0.

It was just taken from the original report that's all.

def

Those notes that you have in front of

you.

Is this a

version of your typed written notes*
0.

Yes.

def

Your honor, I would request a copy of tnose. 1 haven't
been provided with a copy of those.
17

Judge

Granted,

def

That will be all

Judge

You may step down.

over to
defendant

the district
engaged

undercover agent
Gdrdan Street.

We

will have

the defendant bound

court for there is probable cause that the

in
on Aug

selling
A at

and

distributing

2850 South

drugs

215 East.

Aug 7

187

One July 25 on 3331 Sue Street and July 17 on 183

EAst Gardan Street, and on July 14 at 331 Sue Street.
Def

to the

We still want a hearing on this.
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ADDENDUM G: Transcript of Joan Davis'
Preliminary Hearing—Testimony of Officer Steve Olson.

m
STATE

vs. Joan Davis

Steve Olson's Testimony

Judge:

Officer if you will come up and be sworn

State:

Officer, will

you state

you full

naoe and spell your

last name, please
Olson:

Yes, it's Steven Olson

State:

And where are you employed?

Olson:

Salt Lake City Police Department

State:

And in what capacity?

Olson:

Patrol officer

State:

In August on 1987 were you still employed?

Olson:

Yes, I was.

State:

And in what capacity

were

you

working

on

August 4,

1987.?
Olson:

I was assigned to Metro Narcotics strike force.

State:

Prior to that time did you have training in the area of
drug enforcement?

Ojson:

Yes, on the street.

State:

Were you

ever made

the aquaintance

of a

lady by the

name of Joan Davis?
Olson:

Yes, I did.

State:

Is she in the court today?

Olson:

Yes , I do.

State:

Would you identify her, please?

Olson:

She is seated in the defense table In gray and black*

Larsen:

Stipulate

that

he

has identified the defendant, your

honor•
State:

Where did you first meet

Olson:

On Aug. 4.

State:

How?

Olson:

I had been

aquainted

Joan Davis?

with

her

son,

who

I

had met

approximately one month earlier,
State:

And his name?

Olson:

Mike Davis.

State:

Did he introduce the two of you?

Olson:

Yes, in a way.

State:

Did you see her or was with her on Aug A.

Olson:

Yes, I was.

State:

What did you do with her that day.

Olson:

I met

Not formally.

with her with her son which was at her residence

which is 140 Gregson.
State:

Is that is Salt Lake County?

Olson:

Yes.

State:

Was anyone else with you or present?

Olson:

Yes, we were outside and Mike and Mrs. Davis and I were
the

only

ones

point when

I

purchase some

that
talked

I
to

could see around. And at that
Mike,

Marijuana from

I

him.

asked

if

I could

I had in the past.

He told me to go to a friends house.
Larsen:

I am going to

object to

your honor.
Judge:

Objection sustained

anything he

says as heresay,

State:

Without indicating what Mike said, what did you do?

Olson:

1 went to a friends house on 3331 So. t>n Sue Street

State:

With who?

Olson:

To wait for Mike.

State:

Who did you go there with?

Olson:

Just my vehicle.

State:

Did Mike appear there?

Olson:

Yes.

State:

Did anyone else appear there?

Olson:

Yes, his mother.

State:

Would you describe the Van.

Olson:

A stripped Van. Dark brown Plymouth Voyager Van.

She was driving a Van.

Brand

new from what I understood at that time.
State:

What happened at this residence at 3331 Sue Street

Olson:

I spoke with Mike again concerning about obtaining some
Marjuana and

he directed

that point I got into

me to

the

Van

get into the Van. At
with

another juvenile

that was also at the residence by the name of Walt.
State:

Was the Defendant still driving the van at that time?

Olson:

Yes.

State:

Where did she drive you to?

Olson:

We

went

to

an

apartment complex located approximaty

2800 So 200 East in that area.
State:

What happened there?

Olson:

We vent into the
waited in

rear parking

Lot;

At that

point I

the Van, Mrs. Davis waited in the Van and so
3

did Walt*

I

had

given

Marijuana for

me.

Mike

He left

$35

to

and vent

apartment and after about 5 min

purchase some
Into an unknown

later he

got into the

State:

Alright, what happened.

Olson:

He informed me that he had the Marijuana.

Showed it to

Van.

me.

Mrs. Davis

drove us

all in

the Van

out of the

apartment complex.
State:

Was there a conversation about Marijuana?

Olson:

Yes.

State:

Prior to that time?

Olson:

Yes.

State:

Was Mrs. Davis a part of that conversation?

Olson:

Yes she was.

State:

Go ahead.

Olson:

We vent approximately

State:

I

guess

what

I

am

where you were going

asking is was there any question
when you

got to

2800 South 2nd?

East.
Olson:

No, we

were leaving

to divide

up Marijuana.

purchased a quarter, I believe and

ve were

We had

each going

to purchase an 1/8 or have 1/8.
State:

Who is each.?

Olson.

Mrs. Davis

and

I.

At that point ve vent about 1/2

block east and a little south of the apartment complex.
4

which I put down as 2850 So on 215 Eas•

She pulled the

Van, Mrs. Davis pulled the Van

the curb*

that

time,

she

turned

over to

on the interior light and was

handed the marijuana bag by her son.
metal

tray

divided it

and
up

finished she

poured
into

At

the

two

mar

separate

She had

on

a round

to the tray and

piles.

When she

asked me if the portions she divided were

fair and I said that was fine and

she had

me hold the

baggy up, a small plastic bag and she dumped my portion
of the marijuana into the bag.
State:

What did she do with the other portion?

Olson.

She kept that on the
baggy.

tray

because

she

had

no other

And during the time she was dividing it up she

handed a small portion to her

son to

load a marijuana

pipe with.
State:

And did he?

Olson:

Yesf he did.

State:

Was that pipe smoked by any one?

Olson:

Yes that

pipe was passed around the Van to everyone in

the Van.

I symalated

and

all

three

of

them smoked

marijuana.
State:

Vhere did you go from there?

Olson:

We drove

back to 3331 Sue Street where my vehicle was.

Myself and Mike Davis

got out

of the

Van.

I had my

portion of the marijuana. I drove him to some relatives
on Gordan lane
5

State:

What did you do with the marijuana you acquired?

Olson:

I went imnedicately
undercover

after

narcotics

dropping

pad,

Mike

off

to our

the apartment, and wrote a

reportfsealed the evidence in

an

envelope,

taped it,

initialed it and put it into a safe.
State:

Did all the incident and all your driving occur in Salt
Lake County.?

Olson:

Yes it did.

Judge:

Mr. Larsen do you want to crossexamine?

Larsen:

Thank you your honor.

Larsen:

You say you created

a report

on this

matter, Is that

correct?
Olson:

Yes, I did.

Larsen:

May

I

approch

the

witness?

Would you look at the

documents that have been supplied to

me by

the County

Attorneyfs office particularly these pages here. Would
that be your report that you

handled?

Would you look

at them?
Olson:

Yes, that is a copy of it.

Larsen:

Was that

the only that you created as a report on this

incident?
Olson:

Yes.

Larsen:

There was

no

incident?

Is that correct?

Olson:

I had

other

notes

a ledger that I kept

that

you

have

on this

on listing contacts that I

kept. So I could identify them later on.

Larsen:

Do you have that ledger with you.

Olson:

No, I don't.

Larsen:

Do you have that in your possession somewhere?

Olson:

Yes, 1 do.

Larsen:

In your report, do you put things that

are significant

relating to the incident.
Olson:

I put all the facts that occured

Larsen:

This

fact

about

loading

the

pipe up and passing it

around is a significant thing?
Olson:

Yes.

Larsen:

And yet you didnft bother to
did you?

Is

put that

in your report,

there anything else that you left out of

the report.
Olson:

No.

Larsen:

No?

Olson:

Not that I am aware of.

Larsen:

Wasn't Kevin present in the Van?

Olson:

Who?

Larsen:

Kevin, do you know a guy by the name of Kevin?

Olson:

No.

Larsen:

On Aug 4, you

didn't have

anything to

do with

a guy

named Kevin?
Olson:

No.

Larsen:

Have

you

looked

at

that relate back to
Olson:

your ledger of contacts recently
that period of time?

If you are referring to a man that

I understood

to be

Kevin and it turned out to be Jimmy Williams.
Larsen:

Was Jimmy Williams in the Van?

Olson:

No, he was not.

Larsen:

Was there

anybody that

may have

been called Kevin in

the Van?
Olson:

No there was not.

The

only persons

in the

Van were

myself, Mrs. Davis, her son and a guy named Walt.
Larsen:

What was Walt f s last name?

Olson:

I have no idea.

Larsen:

Do you know where Walt lives.?

Olson:

I did.

Larsen:

This took place on Aug. A.

Olson:

Yes.

Larsen:

At any

We have not identified that yet.

His family has since moved.

other time

Is that correct.?

did you have any other contact with

Mrs. Davis?
Olson:

I spoke to her once in a while
contact her son.

at the

But other than that, no.

Larsen:

Your main contact was with her son?

Olson:

Yes.

Larsen:

And

you

said

house trying to

you

have

done deals with him on prior

occassions?
Olson:

Yes, I have.

Larsen:

Is it a fact on this
was with

occasion that

Mike and Walt didnft you talk with them about

this deal?
Olson:

your communication

Yes.
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Larsen:

Was it your understanding that Mrs* Davis was

going to

drive you over to this apartment complex?
Olson:

She would drive us all over.

That is what I understood

from her son.
Larsen:

Is it a fact that Mrs. Davis didn't give you any money?

Olson:

No f she didn f t give me any money, no.

Larsen:

Did you ever ask her for money?

Olson:

No.

Larsen:

Did you ask her to obtain marijuana for you?

Olson:

No.

Larsen:

Did she ask you to obtain marijuana for her?

Olson:

No.

Larsen:

So Mike Davis gave you the money.

You gave

the money

to Mike Davis?
Olson:

Yes.

Larsen:

$35.00?

Olson:

Yes.

Larsen:

When

you

went

over

to

testified that Mike went
Your

sure

that

Walt

the
into

didn't

apartment
the
go

complex, you

apartment complex.
into

the apartment

the

exchanging of

complex?
Olson:

No, he stayed in the Van with us.

Larsen:

Did Walt have anything to

do

with

money?
Olson:

No.

Larsen:

He didn't

give you any money or receive any money from

you?
Olson:

No.

Larsen;

Was your pattern of dealing with

Mike

Davis was that

primarily on the weekends?
Olson:

No, I was under cover, all the way under cover

so just

whenever I could get ahold of him.
Larsen:

Aug 4, what day was that on?

Olson:

I will have to
Lists

Larsen:

refer to

my planner,

I have

no idea.

Tues. here.

What was the conversation with Mrs. Davis when you were
in the VAn?

Olson:

We were speaking about Marijuana.

Her and

Walt and I

were talking about Marijuana.
Larsen:

Wasn°t

her

communication

with

Walt

that

he should

straighten out his life and get away from that stuff
Olson:

At one point she said he should get off speed
he should

get off

and that

speed and all she did was smoke mar

once in a while and that would be

good enough

for him

but that he should get off the hard stuff.
Larsen:

She didn't

mention to

him to get off the Marijuana as

well?
Olson:

No.

Larsen:

Is

it

a

apartment

fact

that

complex

after

that

place?
Olson:

Yes, at 3331 Sue Street.
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you

you

came

back

from the

drove to a Randy Kanab's

Larsen:

And at that time

you

and

Walt

and

Mike

exited the

vehicle?
Olson:

Yes.

Larsen:

Was Randy home at that time?

Olson:

I think he was, but he did not accompany us?

Larsen:

Did you go into Randy's place?

Olson:

Before hand I was in his yard but we didn't go into his
place .

Larsen:

Did Mike and You and Walt go into Randy's place ?

Olsen:

No, because I

took

Mike

to

his

relatives

where he

wanted to go,
Larsen:

Your sure?

Olson:

Yes.

Larsen:

There was

nothing that was distributed with Randy that

night?
Olson:

No, none whatsoever.

Larsen:

Your testimony was that Randy

McNabb

was

not

in the

Van as well?
Olson:

No, he wasn't.

Larsen:

When

did

you

find

out

about

this new Van and Mrs.

Davis's interest in this new Van?
Olson:

Pardon, I do not understand the question.

Larsen

Did you talk to Mrs. Davis about her vehicle, her Van?

Olson:

Did 1 ask her about it?

State:

Your

honor,

I

am

going

irrelevant.
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to

object

to

this

being

Olson:

I donft understand.

Judge:

I don't quite know where we are going.

Larsen:

I am

trying to

find out about the incident and it was

my understanding that there was conversation

about the

Van and her ownership of the Van and J am trying to see
if he remembers that conversation.
Judge:

You may continue.

Larsen:

Do you recall any

conversation

between

you

and Mrs.

Davis regarding the Van.
Olson:

She said

that this

was a brand new Van that she had

just bought.
Larsen:

Did you ask her about it?

Olson:

Nof not that. I

How she made the purchase?

wouldnft ask

that type

of thing.

I

asked her what she paid for it and things like that. I
was just trying to make small
brand

new

and

she

was

take.

telling

us

She said

it was

about it. Kinda

showing it off to us.
Larsen:

What did she tell

you about

the finances

and how she

paid for it?
Olson:

She didn't

say.

I think she said it cost $17,000. We

saved up a long time, or something.
Larsen:

That°s all you recall on the conversation of the Van?

Olson

Yes.

Larsen:

Describe this round tray.

Olson:

It was painted. It looked
house.

A serving tray.
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like

something

out

of the

Larsen:

How big?

Olson:

It was round about that big.

Judge:

Witness shows about 17 or 18" in diameter.

Larsen:

Who resides at 140 Gregson Ave.?

Olson:

Mrs. Davis and her son.

Larsen:

Who resides at the 3331 Sue Street?

Olson:

Randy McNabb.

Larsen:

At what point in

Olson:

When we reached 3331 South Sue Street again.

Larsen:

And that is Randy McNabbfs place.

Olson:

Yes.

Larsen:

Who resides at 2850 South 215 East?

Olson:

Thatfs where

time did Walt exit the vehicle.

we stopped.

That

is where the Marjuana

was divided up.
Larsen:

Are there any buildings?

Olson:

Itfs a residential area.

We

just

pulled

up

to the

curb .
Larsen:

At

the

divided
Olson:

time

that

you

describe

what did Mrs. Davis state at the time.?

During the time that she was
was

talking

scales.

the marijuana being

how

good

actually dividing.

she could divide weed

Saying that she could

do a

was just splitting it up on the tray.
Larsen:

Who ask her to divide it?

Olson:

Mike did.
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good job

Mike

without
and she

Larsen:

Was there

any conversation

as to

how much Mrs. Davis

should have.
Olson:

Yes, it was to be split down the
$35.

My portion

was only

over.

we reached

I give them

to be $20. I was actually

giving him a loan of $15 which he
me when

middle.

was to

give back to

his house when the transaction was

When it was finished, he gave me $10

out of the

$15 and that's the last I saw of it.
Larsen:

Do you know if Mike had any?

Olson:

Had any?

You

mean of

the marjuana.

She gave him a

small amount to load a pipe with.
Larsen.

Do you recall any

other communication

with Mrs. Davis

and yourself?
Olson:

On this occasion?

Larsen:

Yes.

Olson:

No.

Larsen:

Do you recall anyother time you were in her Van?

Olson:

Only when it was seized to search it.

Larsen:

And this was on what day?

Olson:

I think it was the 19th.

Larsen:

Did you have a search warrant for the Van at that time

Olson^

No.

State:

Objection, your honor, itfs not relevant.

Judge.

He has already answered

Larsen:

Can 1 just nave one minute your honor.?

The 19th of Jan. 1988.

Larsen:

Your

honor,

at

this

time,

I don't have any further

questions*
Judge.

Any other questions.

State:

I have no further questions, your honor.

Judge.

Thank you, you may step down.

Other:

The state
talked with
their

had

three

other

Mr. Larsen

testimony.

The
and

witnesses

and we

subpoenad.

agreed to stipulate to

first

would

been

second, John

his testimony was the same and I understand

that this doesnft lock us into
as a

have

this testimony would have been

stricken because of the chain of evidence
Hobson and

I

Trial goes.

their testimony

The third was Dave Murdock

as far
from the

State Crime lab and he has provided us with an analysis
of the

substance that he identified as Marijuana and I

have given Mr. Larsen a copy of that analysis.
Larsen:

The purposes of this hearing, your
the change

Honor, we

agreed of

as per stipulation.

Judge:

State rests then

State:

Yes sir.

Any witnesses for the defendant
Larsen:

None your honor

Judge:

Have you advised Mrs. Davis of her rights

Larsen:

Ted, we have talked about that your honor and she chose
not to testify at this time.

Judge.

That Is your desire, Mrs. Davi6.
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Mrs. Davis. Yes
Judge:

The records will so show.

Both sides submitted.

It will be the order of this court that Mrs. Davis will
be

bound

over

to

stand

Trial in the Third District

Court Case No 88-10087*
Mr.larsen
appearance

will

be

there.

notified
He

in

by
turn

the

court

will

of

your

notify

you.

Therefore, it is very important that you keep
with him.

in touch

